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ABSTRACT
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE:
AN INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANT OF EXPORT STRUCTURE
by Gregory Alan Bonadies
December 2016
This work investigates the connection, independent of other factors, between a
country’s system of law and property rights and patterns of trade. Stronger property
rights institutions are hypothesized to lead to greater diversity in exports and a greater
proportion of higher value-added exports. Production and export possibilities depend on
capital, labor, and technology. Technology is the way in which capital and labor
resources can be organized for productive purposes. Property rights condition
expressions of technology and thus production possibilities and export potential.
Consequently, if property rights vary between countries, then technological expression,
production possibilities, and export potential vary as well. Property rights institutions
govern the expression of individual and firm-level entrepreneurship, and to what extent
entrepreneurs can effectively apply indigenous production factor endowments to develop
commercial enterprises in diverse, and higher value-added industries. Commercial
enterprises leverage available physical and human resources in proportion to
entrepreneurs’ level of effectiveness to yield a country’s set of production capabilities.
The number and types of export industries are constrained by a country’s ability to
expand its production capabilities. Property rights regimes manifest the incentive
structure that determines entrepreneur effectiveness; entrepreneur effectiveness leads to
increases in number and diversity of production capabilities. Diversity of industry
ii

production capabilities allows for diversity in exports, and complex industry capabilities
allow production and export from higher value-added industries. A time-series crosssection (TSCS) analysis of empirical data for 109 countries from 2005 to 2013 shows
evidence of a direct relationship between property rights and diversity and complexity of
a country’s exports. These findings identify a significant institutional determinant of
trade that can be used along with measures of factor endowment, demand structure, and
proximity measures to characterize and explain export patterns. Results of the study
invite further research to explore the relation of diversification in exports to the
advantages of production and export portfolio diversification and to causes of a nation’s
economic growth, development, stability, and resilience in general.
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CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
A Ghanaian land-holder must often supply the security resources to protect his
land against squatters and others who seek to exploit what is not theirs. In some locales,
informal property rights traditions prohibit exchange or use of land for any reason if
family members are buried within its boundary. Do weak or restrictive property rights
law and lax enforcement capabilities in Ghana limit a land-holder’s options to use his
land productively? Do these legal and property rights limitations in Ghana create
conditions ill-suited to efficient use of resources for building manufacturing concerns to
produce more complex goods rather than, or in addition to, Ghana’s major exports of
primary commodities gold, manganese, and cocoa plant derivatives? Women in
developing countries are often characterized as possessing greater propensity than men to
productively invest resources (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005). However, formal and
informal laws in many African, Asian, and Latin American countries prohibit women
from owning property or businesses, effectively blocking an entire sub-class of
entrepreneurs from opportunities to invest resources productively. According to Deere
and León de Leal (2001), women own less than 1% of the world’s property. Registering
property in Angola takes 191 days compared with the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) country average of 24 days. Starting a business
in Angola takes 66 days and costs 130% of per capita income compared with the OECD
member country average of 11 days and costs of less than 4% of per capita income. Do
Angola’s relatively protracted legal and regulatory requirements and high costs for
operating a business dissuade potential entrepreneurs from creating higher value-add
manufacturing concerns in Angola?
1

South Korea now produces and exports a variety of complex goods such as microprocessors, cruise ships, and automobiles even though this country is relatively poorlyendowed with natural resources. In 1960, twelve years after the republic was formally
established, South Korea’s per capita GDP ($1,428 USD PPP) was lower than most Latin
American countries and some Sub-Saharan African countries at the time. The country’s
savings rate was low; it had a relatively small domestic market size, few indigenous
resources, poor coal reserves, hilly and mountainous terrain, and a geographic area the
size of Indiana in the United States. By 1986, in the span of 25 years – approximately
one generation – South Korea’s manufacturing industries accounted for 30% of its GDP
which had grown to $6,608 USD PPP per capita. Korea has a relatively well-developed
system of law and property rights compared with near-neighbors Cambodia and Laos
which have less mature systems of law and property rights and which feature a paucity of
manufactured goods exports (only apparel and footwear). Post-Mao reformer Deng
Xiaoping’s rapid and comprehensive implementation of changes in China’s system of
law and property rights (Bonadies, 2010) was followed by a meteoric rise in the country’s
manufactured good production and export capabilities. Prior to 1978, private ownership
of property was forbidden by law in China, and economic planning was performed by a
centralized bureaucracy principled on an intensely statist regime of governance and
exclusive dependence on protected, state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Is there a
connection, independent of other factors, between the system of law and property rights
in a country and what kinds of goods it produces and exports? An attempt is made in this
work to answer this question by connecting theories, concepts, and principles related to
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economic development, institutions, production, and international trade and by examining
results of an empirical study.
Background
Trade among nations began, ostensibly, when nations came into being. Local and
long-distance trade among peoples pre-dates the establishment of the geographic and
political boundaries we recognize as circumscribing sovereign territories. As groups of
people cohered into groups distinguished by national borders, merchants, scholars,
government officials and others began to institute accounting practices that recorded the
type, value, and amounts of goods that were exchanged between and among the distinct
groups. Thus, international trade measures were born. Silk, sows, spices, and scissors
were grown, raised, or manufactured, and were shipped near and far according to the
vagaries of demand, supply, and price mechanisms in an ever-expanding global
marketplace of sovereign nations. Domestic governments grew in size and scope of
authority as nations coalesced on the global political stage introducing (or perhaps
magnifying) the role of governance in the producer/consumer/exchange relationship.
Kings, emperors, feudal lords, Moghuls, and tribal chieftains presumably influenced trade
more directly through conquest, treaties, confiscation or coerced tribute, and by other
means prior to the rise of modern national systems of governance which implement
formal and informal systems of law and property rights.
Attempts to explain patterns of international trade antedate publication of seminal
ideas on the topic presented in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of
Nations (1776) by modern economics founder Adam Smith. Contemporary theorists
continue to distill the most salient forces underlying trade from among many possible
3

variables including resource endowments, trade policy, geographic proximity, and unique
preferences, tastes, attributes, or other characteristics of societies engaging in the
exchange of goods and services across international boundaries. Volume, value, and type
of goods that comprise a country’s export and import product spaces and the set of
partners with whom it conducts bilateral exchange characterize a country’s trade
structure. Absolute and comparative advantage trade theories emerged in the 18th and
19th centuries, postulated respectively by Adam Smith and David Ricardo, to explain why
countries trade and what types of goods are imported or exported. Countries export those
goods which they can produce at a relatively lower absolute cost compared with other
countries, according to Smith (1776). Countries export those goods which they can
produce at a relatively lower opportunity cost compared with other countries, according
to Ricardo (1817). Opportunity cost is measured in terms of the trade-off between
applying a country’s resources to produce one type of good versus another type of good.
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory emphasizes relative abundance of production inputs
(capital and labor) as the main determinant of comparative advantage and trade structure
(Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson, 1980). Accordingly, capital abundant countries
export those goods whose production is relatively more capital-intensive and import
those goods whose production is relatively more labor-intensive. Conversely, labor
abundant countries export those goods whose production is relatively more laborintensive and import those goods whose production is relatively more capital-intensive.
Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin trade theories respectively attribute the development of
comparative advantage in trade to technology differences and to differences in resource
endowments. Ricardian trade theory claims that direction, volume, and type of goods
4

traded reflect differences in productivity among nations due to differences in technology.
Comparative advantage is revealed ex post in the composition of a country’s export and
import product spaces. Despite a modicum of empirical support, demand structure, and
other so-called “gravity” trade models, rest on more dubious economic foundations.
Linder’s hypothesis implies that affinity between countries in terms of aggregate
preferences is instrumental in determining trade structure (Linder, 1961). Gravity models
predict trade flow patterns based on some aggregate characteristic of trading partner
economies or cultures (analogous to the concept of mass in Newton’s equation for
modeling the force of gravitational pull between two physical bodies) and the distance
between trading partners (Tinbergen, 1962). Contemporary trade theory and empirical
studies recognize and incorporate a combination of technology, production factor
endowments, and demand structure variables to explain trade structure, and include
additional control variables to formulate more robust explanatory models of trade
(Feenstra, 2007).
“New trade theory” adds institutional variables to explain the structure of
international trade (Parinello, 2000). Nearly a half-century of institutional economics
scholarship, stemming from the foundational work of Coase (1937, 1960) and empirical
studies, points to the preeminent role that institutions play in affecting economic
outcomes (Williamson, 2007). Institutions are the “rules of the game” in a society – the
formal and informal constraints that “define and limit the set of choices of individuals”
(North, 1990:3-4). All social, economic, and political institutions in a society derive
from the society’s principles and values regarding property rights. Institutions embody
the incentive structure for human social behavior, including action and purpose with
5

respect to production, exchange, and consumption of goods. Institutions shape the
decisions of those individuals responsible for producing goods and services for domestic
and foreign consumption.
Every country has a system of law. The system of law may be more or less
formal and more or less broad in strength and scope (Fukuyama, 2004). National systems
of law are based on a combination of formal documents, such as a constitution, bills of
rights, statutes, regulations, and informal traditions, morés, and customs. Nations are
often comprised of local and regional legal sub-systems that may be subject to bounds
and directives of the national system of law. While variety in types of national systems
of law are as numerous as the number of countries that exist in the international
community, all systems of law are based on notions and conventions regarding property
rights. Two key ideas are postulated and explored in this work with regard to the system
of law associated with a particular sovereign jurisdiction: (1) ultimately, all law concerns
property rights, and (2) law in principle and law in practice are quite distinct phenomena.
Statement of the Problem
Trade theory, in general, seeks to explain patterns of international exchange of
goods. Measures of trade vary. Broadly, international trade comprises descriptions of
what countries trade what goods with what other countries, and in what volumes. More
narrowly, each country in the international system can be characterized by the types of
goods that it exports, that is, the degree of diversity of goods in the country’s export
product space (Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2010). This work investigates the connection,
independent of other factors, between the system of law and property rights in a country
and diversity in types of goods the country exports. Stronger property rights institutions
6

in a country are hypothesized to lead to greater diversity in goods exported from that
country.
Conceptual Framework for the Study
Comparative advantage is the proximal determinant of international trade
structure. A model is developed to test the proposition that property rights represent one
of the ultimate determinants of a country’s production capabilities and what goods a
country can produce for export. Entrepreneurial ability, production factor endowment
(labor and capital), and institutions together establish production capabilities and
therefore what goods a country produces. If entrepreneurial ability is a universal
characteristic of the world’s population (Smith, 1776, I. ii.4:120), it remains that
differences in production capabilities between countries are conditioned by institutional
factors and production factor endowment. It is argued that variation in property rights
institutions between countries governs the expression of entrepreneurial ability, and to
what extent entrepreneurs can effectively apply indigenous factor endowments
productively in developing diverse commercial enterprises. Institutional factors in a
country condition indigenous entrepreneurial capability rendering the potential for
entrepreneurial effectiveness. Entrepreneurs leverage available physical and human
resources in proportion to their level of effectiveness to yield a country’s production
capabilities. A country’s production capabilities shape its production possibility frontiers
and, consequently, its comparative advantage relative to other countries with whom
potential trading relationships exist. In sum, property rights regimes manifest the
incentive structure that determines entrepreneur effectiveness; entrepreneur effectiveness
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leads to proliferation of diverse manufacturing concerns, and manufacturing portfolio
diversity allows for diversity in exports.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of the study is three-fold: (1) to augment existing explanations of
export diversity by investigating the effect of a specific institutional factor, i.e., property
rights, (2) to describe the mechanism by which property rights influence export diversity,
and (3) to conduct an empirical test of hypotheses relating measures of property rights
and export diversity.
Research Questions
Three primary questions motivate the present research project. What is the
mechanism by which systems of law and property rights affect export diversity? What
research literature and prior studies relate institutional factors and trade outcomes? What
empirical evidence supports the contention that property rights is one of the determinants
of export diversity?
Background
Trade research tests the effect on trade outcomes of factor endowments, trade
barriers, proximity or other demand characteristics, and some large-grained institutional
factors, but does not evaluate explicitly the influence of property rights. Previous
research has not comprehensively described the precise mechanism relating system of
law and property rights with trade outcomes, and specifically, with the level of diversity
in countries’ exports. Knowledge of how variation in institutional attributes influence
trade patterns may inform policymakers and commercial enterprises concerning trade-
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enabling institutional reform efforts, and may provide insights for achieving static and
dynamic gains from increasing levels of international trade (Samuelson, 1962).
Policy directed at increasing export portfolio diversification may benefit national
economies in terms of economic stability and resilience to shock, if such diversification
yields benefits similar to those related to financial portfolio diversification. Also, a mix
of goods, some of which are higher value-added and less elastic in price given changes in
demand, may reduce the effect of deteriorating terms of trade. In either case, armed with
evidence that certain institutional forces determine level of diversity in exports, national
policy makers may explore changes to their legal and regulatory institutions to the benefit
of their constituents.
Scope and Limitations of the Study
There exists a substantial discrepancy between systems of law and property rights
as these are formally codified and the actual institutions, or “rules of the game,” as they
are practiced. The operative issue for the purpose of the present study is the effect of
property rights institutions in practice on the behavior of the decision-makers who are
responsible for production. Hence, the primary independent variable is necessarily a
normative measure. It is intended that the results of the study may generalize to the
population of sovereign nations recognized by the United Nations. However, due to
limitations on availability of, and access to, pertinent data, some countries are excluded
from the study.
Trade is a complex social phenomena whose outcomes are invariably determined
by myriad factors. The potential for confounding and interaction effects in variables
exists, and reciprocal determination of trade outcomes and formation and development of
9

institutions is a possibility. Trade theory is not settled science: many established models
are highly constrained by various assumptions and caveats, potential explanatory
variables are numerous, and the empirical data record may be incomplete or of
questionable accuracy. Product and industry classification schemes for categorizing
goods do not necessarily reflect a scientifically-based taxonomic structure, level of
disaggregation or granularity in analysis of trade data may be problematic, and the
phenomena of entrepôt exchange could obfuscate attributions of manufacturing origin.
Theoretical frameworks for characterizing institutions and their impact on economic
outcomes are nascent as well. Assumptions and caveats are provided, and additional
tactics and strategies are applied in developing the model to address each limitation
described above.
Organization of the Study
The study is organized into six chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 2
provides a review of the empirical literature and pertinent prior studies and establishes a
theoretical foundation. Chapter 3 presents an empirically testable model together with
hypotheses for testing the effect of property rights on export diversity. Chapter 4
describes the research methods and findings including the research design, data type and
sources, variables, assumptions, and statistical method applied in the empirical test.
Chapter 5 summarizes the empirical findings and discusses the results. Chapter 6
addresses how and why systems of law change, develops a model of bias in property
rights towards private or public interests, discusses the implications for policy
development, and concludes with suggestions for future research. Appendices and
references supplement the six chapters that comprise the study.
10

CHAPTER II - THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS
Production is a function of capital and labor endowments and technology (Solow,
1957; Romer, 1994). Technology, the means by which input resources are transformed
into outputs, is the sum of ideas, methods, and processes concerning the organization of
capital and labor resources for productive purposes. Capital and labor resources are
property and are subject to the constraints of a country’s system of law governing rights
of use and exchange for all purposes, including production. Since property rights may
either enhance or diminish use and exchange of endowments, these rights govern
application of technology in the production process. Systems of law and property rights
vary among countries. If property rights govern application of technology, then
technology levels will also vary between countries resulting in differences in production
capabilities. In short, property rights affect production decisions and the creation and
development of new industries which determine comparative advantage and countries’
choice of exports. This chapter presents a theoretical explanation linking export
complexity with property rights. Concepts and measures of export complexity and
property rights are first defined and specified, then the mechanisms whereby property
rights affect export complexity are explored.
Export Complexity
Hausmann and Hidalgo (2010) formulate a simple and intuitive method of
characterizing trade patterns in the concept of export complexity. Export complexity is
defined as the number of different industries for which a country has a comparative
advantage (diversity) and the relative uniqueness of exporting industries among trading
nations (ubiquity). An index of export complexity for each country is represented by an
11

eigenvector calculated by combining average diversity and average ubiquity matrices
(Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2010). An eigenvector is a linear equation solution associated
with characteristics of a square matrix, in this case, a set of indices which represent the
combination of number of different product types and their relative scarcity as exports.
An economic complexity index for each country, and a product complexity index for
each category of goods, are calculated in a recursive method that employs both measures
of diversity and ubiquity (Hausmann, Hidalgo, Bustos, Coscia, Chung, Jimenez, Simoes,
and Yildirim, 2011).
diversity = ∑𝑝 𝑀𝑐𝑝

Equation 1

ubiquity = ∑𝑐 𝑀𝑐𝑝

Equation 2

Mcp is defined as a matrix whose cell value is unity if country c produces good p
and whose cell value is 0 if country c does not produce good p. Measures of export
product space diversity and ubiquity are obtained by summing over the rows or columns
of the respective matrix.
The economic complexity index is a bivalent, open-ended, and continuous
variable. Bivalence implies that index may take either positive or negative values (or
zero), open-ended implies the index has no theoretical upper or lower limit, and
continuous implies that values are not discrete in nature. The mathematical formulation
of export complexity employs revealed comparative advantage (Balassa’s index) as its
fundamental component measure. Balassa’s index is the share of a particular good in a
country’s exports in relation to the share of the good in the entire international system of
trade. Richardson and Zhang (2001) describe revealed comparative advantage as a
12

measure of “relative relative [sic] trade shares” that denotes the “relative competitiveness
of a country’s industry to that of its other industries, relative to global norms” (198).
Revealed comparative advantage (rca) is computed relative to a norm of countries as
given by Equation 3 (Brakman, Inklaar, and Van Marrewijk, 2011). Revealed
comparative advantage, (𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑐 ), for country (c), industry (i), is calculated as the quotient
of two ratios.
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐

𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑐 =

𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑐

⁄𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑓

Equation 3

𝑖
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑓

The numerator of the quotient is the ratio of exports from country c in industry i
to the measures of all exports in country c. The denominator of the quotient is the ratio
of all the exports in industry i from the group of reference countries to the total exports in
all industries of the reference group. An rca value exceeding unity (𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑖𝑐 > 1) indicates a
revealed comparative advantage for a particular country in a particular industry with
respect to the reference country group. Choice of reference group may vary in empirical
analyses, however, the ratio of ratios formulation stands as a unique characteristic of
Balassa index calculations. Hausmann and Hidalgo (2010) argue that the diversity and
ubiquity of a country’s exports reflect capabilities germane to their production.
Industries range from simple to complex based on the capabilities required. Capabilities
include factor endowments and technology required to produce a class of goods. Goods
from more complex industries, which require more capabilities, are less ubiquitous: they
are produced and traded by fewer countries than are goods from more simple industries
which require fewer capabilities. The more diverse and less ubiquitous the set of
industries comprising a country’s exports, the more complex its economy because more
13

types of goods are produced, including a greater number of sophisticated goods. The
complexity of a country’s exports is directly related to its production capabilities. It is
argued here that individuals and firms create production capabilities using capital, labor,
and technology with level of technology being facilitated or inhibited by the prevailing
system of property rights.
Property Rights
Property rights are defined as the rules in a country governing the use and
exchange of technology and endowments for production (Alchian and Demsetz, 1973).
Property rights include the concept of property as a set of rights of use and exchange,
notions of exclusive (private) and non-exclusive (public) use, methods of formal and/or
informal codification, registration of title or deed through administrative processes, the
specification of terms and conditions in contracts governing exchange, a process for
enforcement of contracts, and designation of owners of property. Governments exist to
develop and implement systems of property right laws to control the use and exchange of
property for public and private purposes including production. Systems of property
rights law include legislative, administrative, judicial, police, military, and other
organizations that enforce and adjudicate property rights.
Property rights are manifested pervasively in all societies and may encompass
categorization of property (self, personal, real), specification of who or what can possess
property, for example individuals or corporate entities, deference by gender or marital
status, specification of limits on use through zoning or other regulation, specification of
commons and rights of individuals and interest groups with respect to common use, and
the general social contract for implementing and enforcing property rights through
14

systems of governance. Assessing the effect of property rights on production and export
patterns, requires a method to measure property rights in each country for comparison
and analysis. Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson (2012) describe a Legal System and Property
Rights Index comprised of nine sub-indices: (1) judicial independence, (2) partiality of
courts, (3) protection of property rights, (4) military interference in the rule of law, (5)
integrity of the legal system, (6) legal enforcement of contracts, (7) regulatory costs for
the sale of real property, (8) reliability of police, and (9) the business cost of crime.
Perceptions regarding the protection of property rights reflect the extent to which an
individual or firm can freely choose how their assets are allocated and the degree to
which they have the latitude to seek the highest-valued use for their resources (Pejovich,
1990). Economic decisions, such as those concerning production, are based on perceived
risks, costs, and benefits according to tenets of behavioral economics (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). Consequently, the normative index developed by Gwartney, et al.
(2012) that measures perceived strength and scope of systems of law and property rights,
may be more pertinent to explaining production decisions than specific positive measures
of legal tenets and statutes. Moreover, codified or “black letter” law is invariably distinct
from how a particular system of law is exercised in practice and instantiated in
organizations responsible for regulation, enforcement, and adjudication. Behavioral
economics emphasizes the subjective interpretation of institutional rules of the game, be
they judgements rendered by supreme court justices based on “penumbra” that emanate
from constitutional principles, or an entrepreneur’s expected return on investment and
costs associated with launching a new product development initiative. The broad and
inchoate body of law – statutes, bills, decrees, and edicts – and their extra-legal
15

excrescences in the form of myriad administrative rules and regulations represents an
unwieldy mass from a measurement perspective. Subjective assessment of a state’s
system of law and property rights, albeit normative, offers a tidy and valid practical
measure that is intuitively associated with the production decision process. Now that
concepts and measures of export complexity and property rights have been defined, the
mechanisms linking the two are explored.
Linking Property Rights and Export Complexity
The presence of more sophisticated production capabilities is associated with
strong property rights institutions and contract enforcement (Levchenko, 2004; Nunn and
Trefler, 2013). Although contract enforcement and property rights institutions are often
distinguished in the literature, contract law and enforcement are part and parcel of a
country’s property rights institution and thus may be subsumed under the legislated
strictures, judicial processes, and enforcement mechanisms that characterize a country’s
system of property rights. Several empirical studies link domestic property rights and
contract rules with industry capability to produce goods of varying complexity and trade
outcomes.
In a study of eighty-four countries from 1975 to 1995, Heitger (2004) finds that
security in property rights and legal framework transparency are the ultimate causes of
economic growth, whereas differences in physical and human capital and technology are
proximate causes. Three other empirical studies link measures of national legal
institutions with industry complexity to explain trade in complex and simple goods.
Ferguson and Formai (2009) relate “institution-driven comparative advantage” and the
export of complex goods to contract enforcement. Production of complex goods is a
16

cooperative endeavor involving groups of firms that form clusters of complementary
businesses. According to these authors, weak property rights (legislation, adjudication,
and enforcement) concerning terms of contract lead to decreased vertical integration, less
specialization in production organization, and increased transaction costs. The absence
of an effective system of property rights does not allow or promote the formation of
vertically-integrated firms and collaborative clusters capable of producing more
sophisticated goods. Bekowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006) find evidence in an analysis
of trade data for fifty-five countries from 1982 to 1992 which implies that countries with
stronger legal institutions tend to export goods from more complex industries and import
goods from less complex industries. Ma, Qu, and Zhang (2012) find similar results in a
study of firm-level data from twenty-two countries: a stronger legal system in terms of
contract enforcement and low corruption (distortion of property rights) is conducive to
greater exports of goods from complex industries. Krishna and Levchenko (2009) offer
empirical evidence relating level of industry complexity to volatility and comparative
advantage in complex or simple industries. They find that countries with less complex
industrial sectors produce less complex goods due to less rigorous contract enforcement
or to lower levels of human capital. These countries tend to specialize in production of
less complex goods which happen to be associated with higher demand-side volatility.
Countries self-select into exporters of various mixes of complex goods and/or simple
goods based on their production capability which, it is argued here, is a function of their
property rights institutions and the level of production-enabling infrastructure generated
by these institutions. Levchenko (2004) concludes that “International trade… leads to a
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race to the top in institutional quality. Countries improve institutions as they compete to
capture a share of the advantageous sectors” (37).
A new industry implies new sets of capabilities of production; new means and
methods for organizing capital and labor to produce new goods. Growth in production
may occur in four ways. The first is an increase in output of a given good, for example,
increasing number of bushels of wheat harvested per year. The second is an increase in
output of similar types of goods (within the same industry), for example producing rice,
corn, sugar cane, or soy in addition to wheat. The third is augmenting output of a simpler
set of goods with more complex sets of goods in the same industry, for example, adding
refinery processing to primary commodity mining or adding processing/packaging
capabilities to basic animal husbandry and agricultural activities. The fourth way growth
may occur is to pursue production of sets of goods of increasing complexity, for example,
moving from production of rice to production of radios to production of rockets.
Comparative advantage may or may not follow from developing a new industry based on
new capabilities. Establishing a new industry implies new production capabilities. The
ability to export products from the new industry further implies a comparative advantage
in the industry with respect to foreign producers of the same kinds of goods.
In each of the four cases, a country’s manufacturing base moves from less to more
capabilities: smaller size firms may become larger firms, firms may increasingly
specialize, complementary businesses may begin to collaborate more, business
relationships may transform from less complex, less contract-dependent forms to more
complex, more contract-dependent forms, from dependency on less-skilled labor to
greater-skilled labor, and from dependency on less sophisticated technology to more
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sophisticated technology. Changes in level of production imply a priori changes in
system of property rights, according to the argument presented here. Again, substantive
theory regarding causal mechanisms that explicitly relate changes in property rights
institutions to production are scant in the literature. Reciprocal determination between
changes in property rights law and changes in production capabilities and outcomes is
assumed here. There is some anecdotal evidence that drastic changes in property rights
cause changes in production capabilities and outcomes. In these cases, it appears that
changes in property rights institutions precipitate changes in production organization and
allocations of capital and labor that allow capabilities to evolve. Examples of how
changes in property rights institutions affects production is Lenin’s 1917 Decree on Land
that abolished private property in Russia, the restrictive land use policies implemented in
the Russian 1920 Land Code, and the Stalin’s “mass collectivization” in Russia
implemented after Lenin’s death in 1924 (Madalo, 2002). These changes led to a system
of allocation of capital and labor resources to production predominately by government
fiat resulting in decades of underutilization of factor resources and limited production
capabilities across most industries throughout the Soviet Union. Other examples of
dramatic changes in property rights institutions include nationalization or expropriation
of privately-owned corporations and even entire industries in Argentina, Bolivia, the
collapse of the Zimbabwean economy due in part to attempts to rectify disparities in
property rights by government seizure of commercial farms (Richardson, 2005), and the
example of China’s adoption of Marxist principles in abolishing private property rights
from 1949 through 1976 in favor of less efficient state-directed enterprises (Qin and
Zhou, 2008).
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New industries, new production capabilities, and new classes of exports develop
over months, years, or decades in a country and involve decisions by many individuals
and firms to enter a market by producing new classes of goods (van den Bergh, Hofkes,
and Oosterhuis, 2006). New industries and new export opportunities arise through an
accumulation and agglomeration of entrepreneurial choices and actions by suitablyincented individuals and firms in the production nexus. Assuming a causal connection
between property rights and production decisions, it is expected that changes in the
former will be accompanied by changes in the latter, which presumably lag developments
in property rights institutions. However, no attempt is made here to evaluate the
longitudinal process of change in property rights and exports for a given country, but to
test empirically in a static comparison the hypothesis that certain measures of property
rights can be used to reliably and consistently explain differences in export outcomes
between countries.
The dissertation attempts to explain international trade patterns, specifically,
differences in the varieties of goods that countries export with a simple model
distinguishing trade outcomes due to differences in property rights. Its simplicity and
minimalist principle is both a strength and a weakness. While the model may potentially
explain patterns and trends in trade, its central independent variable (a) has a pervasive
effect, (b) is normative, (c) is difficult to measure, and (d) is the primordial cause in a
process involving a chain of intermediary variables. Property rights, a particular feature
of the rule of law, broadly affects patterns of human behavior with respect to commerce –
the production, exchange, and consumption of goods that determine economic outcomes.
Normative measures are based on perceptions that color the myriad decisions and
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transactions that comprise a dynamic economic system. Individual cognitive processes
that intermediate decision-making are inherently difficult to measure. Many, if not most,
models of trade include variables such as level of production technology, infrastructure,
labor productivity, or other factor proportion measures in addition to institutional factors.
Interdependency of these measures results in endogeneity problems in the trade models.
Barriers to trade may have endogenous or exogenous origins. But the endogenous
institution of property rights determines variation in, and sophistication of, infrastructure,
technological capabilities, labor productivity, and practically every facet of economic
behavior in a country. Costinot and Komunjer (2007) separate influence of institutional
variables, such as “quality of contract enforcement,” from influence of production
technology and labor productivity factors on trade outcomes. These variables are
inextricably entwined. At the least, they are reciprocally determined; at most, institutions
determine production technology and labor productivity.
Most studies in the literature concerning content of trade do not address microeconomic foundations of the effect of different systems of property rights on trade
outcomes. Typical conceptualizations of production functions assume that production
techniques differ in numbers and levels of inputs, have inputs that vary in fixed
proportions and are substitutable, have monotonic and convex properties, are subject to
production scaling and to the ‘law’ of diminishing marginal product (Varian, 2006).
More realistically, combinations and permutations of technological alternatives may
feature non-linearities and interaction effects. Solow comments on this much overlooked problem in production economics: “…the economic theory of production usually
takes for granted the ‘engineering’ relationships between the inputs and outputs and goes
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from there” (Solow, 1967:26). Input factors do not spontaneously combine themselves to
generate output. Nor can it be assumed that the production organization implied by the
function, the manner in which input factors are structured and applied, results in the most
efficient way to produce output. An elaboration of the microeconomic foundations of
trade outcomes lies outside the scope of the present work. A few comments must suffice
to convey the substance of its conclusions.
A country’s system of property rights constrains production possibilities, “the set
of all combinations of inputs and outputs that comprise a technologically feasible way to
produce” (Varian, 2006:323). Substantial and procedural aspects of private property
rights law compel or inhibit expropriation of capital investment resources, and strengthen
or weaken the link between effort, risk, investment and reward in terms of enhancing
utility of property holders. Policies and regulations concerning common property (public
goods) may be structured to galvanize or bridle development and sustenance of
competitive exporting industry clusters. Varying scope and specificity of default and
mandatory rules of contract in a legal system affect exposure of parties to risk in dealing
with the inevitability of incomplete contracts. Relationship specificity in regard to
commercial transactions reflects complexity of factor markets. Together, the nature of
property rights and contract infrastructure determine what kinds of industries are feasible
in a given country, specifically, whether or not, and the degree to which, complex
industries are viable. If the legal climate in a country is conducive to the development of
competitive exporting complex industry clusters, the country may establish a comparative
advantage in that industry. Otherwise, a country is limited to establishing a comparative
advantage only in simpler industries, given minimum requisite institutions of governance
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to provide national defense, domestic security, public health, as well as other productionenabling public and private infrastructure such as banking, insurance, and financial
institutions. The main research hypothesis asserts that comparative advantage, as
determined by perceived strength of attributes of the system of property rights, ceteris
paribus, reflects the direction and degree of exchange of goods from industries of varying
complexity among nations.
Export Patterns and Theories of Economic Growth and Development
Theories of economic growth and development endeavor to explain why some
countries are wealthier or poorer than others, why countries differ in the distribution of
wealth among their populations, and why there are differences in production capabilities
between countries. In addition, these theories describe and attempt to explain differences
in imports and exports and in trade patterns in general with respect to development
factors. Many theories emphasize the importance to development of transitioning from
production and export exclusively of primary and agricultural goods to production and
export of manufactured goods. These theories highlight differences in price elasticities of
demand and degree of ubiquity of production for primary, agricultural, and manufactured
goods and elaborate the implications of the mix in types of goods countries import and
export. Explanations of trade patterns are found, implicitly or explicitly, in all theories of
growth and economic development. Some theories distinguish economic growth and
economic development, the former defined as increases in income resulting from an
increase in production volume of goods, and the latter focusing on increases in the
diversity of goods produced, namely, from the development of new industries. Often
these theories categorize goods into three major sectors – primary goods, agricultural
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goods, and manufactured goods, with the process of transitioning from primary and
agricultural production to manufactured goods being called industrialization.
Industrialization is associated with the transition from extraction of primary goods such
as oil, coal, and metallic ores and from family-based, small-scale subsistence farming to a
class-based production system composed of capitalist owners of the means of production
and the proletariat, or wage laborers.
Trade is measured in terms of type, quantity, and value of goods imported and
exported and among whom goods are traded. The relationship of trade with growth and
development depends on how these concepts are defined. Is the relationship causal, and
if so, what is the direction of cause and effect? Schumpeter contrasts economic growth as
“a gradual process of expansion of production – producing more of the same and using
the same methods in order to do so,” and economic development as a “’new combination
of productive means,’ such that either the conditions of production of existing goods are
transformed, and/or new goods are introduced, or new sources of supply or new markets
are opened up, or and industry is reorganized…in each case innovation is entailed: in
production methods, products, markets, or industrial organization” (Hunt, 1989:23-24).
Growth, in other words, does not entail substantial changes in production organization
and capabilities, whereas development occurs in “fits and starts” (ibid) with marked
discontinuities in established processes of production organization and capabilities.
Given Schumpeter’s distinction of growth and development, it is only the latter that
implies the creation of new industries that makes possible increased diversification in
exports. The association of predominate export of primary goods and low diversity in
exports among less-developed countries appears to be a feature or symptom in all the
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major growth and development theories, although theorists differ in assigning the causes
of this condition.
The “balanced growth” model described by Rosenstein-Rodan (1944) and Nurske
(1953) asserts a “vicious circle” of low income and low unemployment coupled with a
small domestic market and the “Duesenberg effect” that leads to market failures.
According to the Duesenberg effect, increases in discretionary income following growth
in primary good export driven by comparative advantage exchange is spent on increased
consumption of more expensive, higher-value added imported goods and not used to
augment savings/investment rate to further accelerate industrialization and a sustained
growth pattern. In this scenario, insufficient savings for capital investment coupled with
little incentive to scale production precludes developing industries that could have a
comparative advantage in trade. The “low level equilibrium trap” (Liebenstein, 1957)
attributes arrested growth and development to a low initial income level that does not
increase as fast as population growth, eliminating the occurrence of a tipping point at
which capital can be accumulated and competitive, comparative-advantage industries
developed. The “cumulative causation” model (Myrdal, 1957) also cites low levels of
per capita income and high population growth leading to the low savings and low capital
investment required for industrialization, but adds low skills and poor health, which
together destine some countries to primary good export exclusively. Myint (1954)
attributes “economic backwardness” and inability to develop comparative advantage
export industries to unequal market forces, social institutions, and prejudice. The
“unbalanced growth” model (Hirschman, 1958) emphasizes lack of organizational
capability as the key causal feature of diminished growth, development, and industry
25

export prospects. The theories of Bauer and Yamey (1957) reference institutions,
including law and order, and values as key factors in development arguing the role of
government is to remove impediments to private savings and investment, but do not
explain what the impediments are and how they are to be removed. Neo-Marxist scholars
Baran (1962) and Frank (1978) attribute economic malaise and poor export prospects to a
collusion between domestic bourgeois monopoly capitalists and their foreign investor
accomplices who suppress and exploit the masses to extract economic surplus. The
inevitable result of the exploitation is socialist revolution and overthrow of the oppressive
ruling class. The theories of both Lewis (1954) and Rostow (1956) emphasize the
structural dichotomy of subsistence farming on one hand, and capitalism using wage
labor on the other, and examine the transformation of the former to the latter in the
development process. The impetus for growth and development originates with members
of the capitalist class according to Lewis, and with either or both of private sector and
public sector entrepreneurs according to Rostow who delves more deeply into precursor
aspects of culture and social institutions required for growth and development. A critic
of export-led growth, Prebisch (1962) argued that managing imports is the key to
development: industrialization arises from substituting capital goods imports for
consumer imports. Low income elasticity of demand for primary goods exports to more
developed countries only leads to deteriorating terms of trade. Protectionism, in the form
of import-substituting industrialization that precludes import of certain types of goods,
forces domestic development of diverse industries, the growth of domestic markets, and
the future prospect of higher value-added, comparative advantage industry exports.
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Progress in growth and development in the perspective of these theorists require
changes in monetary, fiscal, and labor policy as well as types of production technology
employed. Virtually all theorists advise more or less pro-active state intervention to
initiate or accelerate economic growth and development on the presumption that forms of
central planning and dirigiste management policies are the antidote to protracted and
entrenched growth and development challenges. State intervention arguably allows
industrialization, maintenance of an agricultural sector important to domestic selfsufficiency – perhaps transformed from small, family-owned subsistence farms to more
efficient larger scale, wage-labor operations – and an opportunity to “take off” to use
Rostow’s term, into the realm of comparative advantage in exports of higher value-added
industries. Many, if not most, of these theories do not examine the underlying reasons for
the circumstances of underdevelopment, and tend to describe macroeconomic
phenomena, that is, the aftereffects, symptoms, or results of more fundamental
microeconomic causes. Downstream macroeconomic outcomes include persistently low
income, few skills, lack of industry, insufficient capital accumulation, and high
population growth. Invariably, economic growth and development theories allude to
institutional impediments without penetrating to the root of arrested development; to the
social structure to which incentives are most immediately attributed – property rights
institutions. Alternative theories of growth and development can be re-examined in terms
of differences in the system of law and property rights that form the incentives for
savings, for entrepreneurial endeavors, and for the conditions required for new industry
creation and the potential for advances in growth and development. Other threads of
research, pertinent to economic growth and trade imply impediments to development of
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production capabilities as described by Schumpeter, include the issues of transaction
costs, trust, contract completeness, and comparative legal systems.
Transaction Costs
Institutions exist to reduce transaction costs in value exchange (economic)
transactions (North, 1990). The “new” institutional economics (Rutherford, 2001)
regards institutions and institutional change as means of “reducing transaction costs,
reducing uncertainty, internalizing externalities, and producing collective benefits from
coordinated or cooperative behavior” (187). Institutions operate to achieve “efficient
solutions” in economic transactions through competition which results in “the most
efficient organizational form, or set of routines, or rules” (ibid). Transactions impute
three types of costs on parties to exchange: (1) costs due to search and information
acquisition, (2) costs related to bargaining and decision-making, and (3) costs associated
with policing and enforcement of agreements (Dahlman, 1979). Aside from direct cost of
endowment exchange between parties to a transaction, costs accrue to the time, effort,
and resources for (a) identifying and engaging buyers, sellers, brokers, and other market
enablers, (b) bargaining and negotiating terms and conditions of exchange, (c)
consummating a contract, (d) ensuring delivery of goods or services as required by the
contract, and possibly (e) having to litigate/adjudicate breach or non-delivery. Cooter
and Ulen (2004) distinguish sets of goods associated with higher or with lower
transaction costs. Transaction attributes associated with lower costs include
“standardized good or service, clear, simple rights, few parties, friendly parties, familiar
parties, reasonable behavior, instantaneous exchange, no contingencies, low costs of
monitoring, and cheap punishments” and transaction attributes associated with higher
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costs include “unique good or service, uncertain, complex rights, many parties, hostile
parties, unfamiliar parties, unreasonable behavior, delayed exchange, numerous
contingencies, high costs of monitoring, and costly punishments” (Cooter and Ulen,
2004:94).
Transactions associated with firms in complex industries are not only greater in
frequency than those associated with firms in simple industries, but also feature many of
the factors associated with higher transaction costs. Legal systems may be differentially
structured to “remove impediments to private agreements” (the Normative Coase
Theorem) thus “lubricating” the bargaining process, and to “minimize the harm caused
by failures in private agreements” (the Normative Hobbes Theorem) by limiting or
eliminating “destructiveness of disagreement” (Cooter and Ulen, 2004:97). Attributes of
legal systems affect the risk factors, investment decisions, and transaction costs that
intermediate production processes through specific mechanisms or channels. These
mechanisms or channels are either associated directly with production process-related
transactions or indirectly with economic efficiency and social function tradeoffs in
considerations of public versus private use of resources. Legal institutions that promote
and optimize individual interests and public interests simultaneously allow more complex
industries to thrive.
Trust
Although difficult to operationalize (Blois, 1999), trust is a key facet of all but the
most trivial of property exchange transactions. Threats of harm to one’s person from
others, or of theft of personal property, or of confiscation of real property dissuade trust
and highly discounts the value of accumulating assets for future use, i.e., for saving and
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investing. In cases of extreme distrust, marginal propensity to save approaches zero.
Lack of a monetary system – exchange exclusively through barter, or a predominately
cash economy – are results of high levels of distrust. In the first case, the pre-requisite
social contract and government structure to support a token economy does not exist, and
in the second case, lack of strong property rights precludes the creation and use of banks
and financial organizations whereby savings is encouraged and capital can be
accumulated and accessed by entrepreneurs for production. Immediate use of assets in
hand becomes preferred; consumption for immediate gratification becomes the norm. In
the extreme, no one is trusted, rampant opportunism is bred where parties to exchange
seek to exploit one another in every transaction. Deception becomes the modus operandi
of all parties to a transaction. A byproduct of unbridled distrust, besides the disincentive
to save, is the unwillingness to venture risk of any personal asset put in the care of
another. Notwithstanding the potential moral hazard inherent in entrusting the
stewardship of one’s asset or property to another for safe-keeping, or in anticipation of an
increased return, extreme distrust proliferates exclusively high-frequency, low-value,
short-term, small-scale commercial transactions. Even if family members could be
trusted, the extent of pooling resources, accumulating and applying savings for capital
investments, and collaborating on larger-scale production initiatives is severely
circumscribed.
Microfinance, microcredit, and social entrepreneurship initiatives in lessdeveloped countries, such as the Grameen Bank (Yunis, 2007) and other examples
(Bornstein, 2007; Smith and Thurman, 2007), attempt to facilitate the creation of small
business start-ups through low-cost micro-loans and pooling of resources from
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individuals in small, local communities. The dynamics of joint liability and social
sanctions are employed with some notable successes through credit cooperatives through
these initiatives in societies where strong property rights are absent or severely lacking
(Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005).
Comparative Legal Systems
Comprehensive comparative legal system studies exist in the literature, for
example Zweigert and Kötz (1998) and Menski (2006), however, there appears to be no
systematic analysis of cross-country trade outcomes as a function of legal system
attributes. The framework presented in this study concerns the relations of legal system
attributes, entrepreneurship, production decision-making, new industry formation, and
development of comparative advantage as reflected in export composition. However,
more work is needed to methodically develop a taxonomy of legal systems perhaps by
parsing constitutions, bills of rights, civil codes, laws, statutes, mandates, and case law
precedents and distilling the words and phrases to salient conceptual terms pertinent to
definition, ownership, use, and exchange of property. In addition, these conceptual terms
must be compared with the organizations, operations, individuals, roles, and
responsibilities of creators, interpreters, and enforcers of a country’s system of law, i.e.,
law in practice. Next, researchers must explore the relation of the actual implementation
of law to the decision-making of individuals responsible for expanding the envelope of
production organization to new industries and new classes of goods. Such a proposed
course of research is certainly ambitious, but precedents exist for its launch, for example
in the landmark case study of Peru by de Soto (2002) concerning the central importance
of a country’s legal system to its production capabilities. Further evidence supporting the
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hypothesis put forth in this study may be gained by case studies of countries that have
experienced radical changes in their property rights regimes in a short period of time.
Taxonomies and perspectives of systems of law are many and varied. Systems of
law may be distinguished on the basis of tradition: common law, civil law, customary
law, religion-based law such as Islamic or Talmudic law, or some combination of these.
Subsets of laws within a system may pertain to rights in person, personal property, or real
property. Areas of law include criminal, civil, and administrative. Legal processes
include legislation – the making of law, litigation – the application and interpretation of
law in disputes, and enforcement of the law. Another perspective of law is through the
organizations that embody the law: legislatures (kings, dictators, congresses,
parliaments, politburos, boards, warlords, or tribal chiefs), courts (supreme,
state/provincial, district, appeals) and the ancillary actors in the judicial process (juries
and lawyers for example), the police and military organizations that conduct local,
state/provincial/federal enforcement functions, and the carceral system. Included in the
organizations that implement any system of law is an extensive peripheral administrative
infrastructure whose total membership may dwarf the number of core actors –
lawmakers, judges, attorneys, and police. The institution of law and property rights in
any country is an ecosystem of sorts comprising people, process, and content. People
constitute the organizations that create and implement legal systems based on the content
or substance of law, and are theoretically, at the same time subject to the law. The
pertinent question for this study, is how the institution of law and property rights affects
the production of goods for export. Each of the perspectives described above can be
analyzed in terms of their effect on production organization, for example, limitations or
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constraints of property rights concerning person – labor/wage laws, personal property –
ability to accumulate capital, and real property – zoning and land use, for allowing
production of certain types of goods. Does the system of law allow the kinds of capital
and labor mobility, use of resources, and entrepreneurship required to create new
industries and new classes of goods that can be produced at a comparative advantage and
exported?
Particular implementations of a given formal legal system vary from country to
country as do informal legal systems. A country’s legal system is not a monolithic
institution; it encompasses a framework of substantive and procedural law and
organizations derived from, and embedded in, the cultural milieu from which it
originates, and in which it is situated. Legal systems may be compared along several
dimensions including the micro-level of “specific legal institutions and rules used to
solve actual problems on particular conflicts of interest”, or the macro-level of “spirit and
style…methods of thought and procedures” (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998:4), the degree of
formality, legal structure, legal actors, categories of procedural or substantive law, and by
tradition (civil, common, customary, etc.). Meintjes-van Der Walt (2006) distinguishes
“inquisitorial” from “adversarial or accusatorial” families of law in a comparison of
procedural aspects of “legal families.” Indicators of inquisitorial systems of law are
associated with civil law tradition and indicators of adversarial or accusatorial systems of
law are associated with common law tradition. Differences in procedural and substantive
aspects of property rights and contract law across countries may have an individual and
combinatorial effect (Summers, 2005) on costs associated with economic transactions.
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Other facets of a legal system include informal mechanisms and processes
associated with non-judicial arbitration and the myriad rules, policies, regulations, and
standard operating procedures in civil society (non-governmental) organizations.
Churches, labor unions, charities, private commercial enterprises, professional
organizations such as academic accreditation organizations, bar associations, and other
certification organizations all possess the capability to structure regulations and the
power to impose sanctions on their members. Formal and informal property rights and
contract laws that govern transactions pertinent to complex industry clusters differ
between countries, even though country legal traditions are similar. An analysis of
informal legal systems is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, however, these systems
are acknowledged to operate in varying degrees in parallel with formal legal systems, for
example in South America (Barton, 2004). These systems exist to “fill a void in property
recognition, contract enforcement, and in some cases, labor rights,” and may play an
inhibitory or facilitative role in a country’s economic development and performance
(Fandl, 2008). An important consideration is the critical distinction of codified law, or
the law that is ‘on the books,’ and how the legal system actually operates or is
implemented, in evaluating the relative effectiveness of a legal system.
Operative issues pertaining to the present research include the degree of
variability between countries’ legal systems on these dimensions, which factors impact or
intermediate transactions relevant to manufacturing and production processes, the
development of competing industry clusters, comparative advantage, and determination
of trade structure, and how to measure and compare legal systems. The relationship of
legal tradition, the nature of a country’s implementation of commercial and contract law,
34

and the effectiveness of the country’s legal system remains an open issue. The subjects
of contract law, commercial law, property law, and business law are inextricably linked
in terms of the relationship among their substantive components and their relevance to
production-related transactions. A detailed comparative analysis of legal systems
between countries and regions is infeasible given the bounds of the present study;
however some method is required to distinguish aspects of domestic legal systems salient
to the problem at hand. Drawing from the International Country Risk Guide, the Global
Competitiveness Report, and the World Bank’s Doing Business initiative, Gwartney,
Hall, and Lawson (2012) construct summary indices for 144 countries for five areas that
measure various aspects of state institutions including legal system and property rights,
size of government, soundness of money, freedom to trade internationally, and
regulation. Nine sub-indices are used to construct the composite index of legal system
effectiveness which encompasses rule of law, security of property rights, and an
independent and impartial judiciary. Implications of results from the present study exist
for those concerned with intra-region commercial and contract law harmonization efforts.
If it is shown that differences between countries’ legal systems are a significant
determinant of trade structure, would a country support a regional law harmonization
effort that diminishes its comparative advantage? Repercussions for distribution of gains
from regional legal system harmonization efforts parallel those for regional trade
liberalization efforts.
Advocates of the idea that secure property rights are essential to “work, invest,
and innovate…to meaningful prices and efficient use of resources,” range from ancient
philosophers such as Aristotle to classical and neo-classical economists Adam Smith,
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Thomas Malthus, David Ricardo, Jean Baptiste Say, and Friedrich Hayek (Heitger,
2004:382). Besley and Ghatak (2010) survey the determinants of property rights and the
mechanisms through which property rights affect economic activity. Among the topics
surveyed are the role of property rights in limiting expropriation of private property, the
adverse effects of insecure property rights on trade, and optimizing the assignment of
property rights, the latter an approach to property rights grounded in the theory of the
firm and the notion of contract completeness.
The comparative analysis of property law in South Africa, India, Chile,
Singapore, and Ghana by Salkin and Gross (2011) evaluates domestic factors affecting
property rights, application and enforcement of property rights, constitutional guarantees
of property rights, and impact of judiciary on property rights. The comparative analysis
addresses mainly differences between countries in property regimes and eminent domain
processes through a discussion of public purpose, compensation, and judicial
interpretation of issues concerning real property. The authors of this comparative study
conclude that some factors operate across countries with unique effects and that other
factors are idiosyncratic. For example, formal property rights laws of all countries
surveyed have clauses concerning the taking of property for public purposes (which are
more or less broadly defined), as well as processes of compensation for such takings.
Some countries have constitutional guarantees of property rights and others do not, some
have rigorous enforcement of property rights while others do not, some have rigorous
administrative processes concerning property, for example, central title or deed registries,
and some have judiciaries active in addressing property rights concerns while others do
not. Ghana has formal property laws, but over 80% of land is held under terms of
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customary (informal and undocumented) law. Lack of formal enforcement of property
rights laws in Ghana has resulted in the formation of private “land guards” hired by either
legitimate or illegitimate land owners to protect against trespassers and squatters. The
country of Singapore, having a small area and high population density, has no
constitutional guarantee of property rights and little opportunity for judicial review, with
broad authority of eminent domain given to government for the purpose of spurring
economic development. Exceptions for government expropriation may exist in some
countries for certain commodities. The Ghanaian government, for example, may exercise
eminent domain without compensation in towns resting on rich mineral deposits, and the
Chilean government may exercise “absolute, exclusive inalienable, and imprescribable
domain over all mines, including guano deposits, metalliferous sands, salt mines, coal
and hydrocarbon deposits and other fossil deposits…despite the ownership held by
individuals or [corporations]” (Chilean Constitution, 1980, article 19(24)). The Chilean
Constitution also affords the government wide latitude in determining the scope of social
function obligations which include “…the Nation’s general interests, the national
security, public use and health, and the conservation of the environmental patrimony”
(ibid).
Altogether, the aspects of legal institutions that concern the ownership and
exchange of property condition investment incentives for holders of property assets.
Property assets include real property, personal property, and the actions and ideas of the
individual with whom employment relationships may be established to appropriate labor
for economic gain. First and foremost, well-defined and well-enforced property rights
mitigate expropriation risk and reduce the cost of protecting property. Appropriation of a
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portion of one’s property endowment by institutions of governance may allow for
protection of property through organizations and functions responsible for providing
physical security, adjudication, and property rights enforcement. Property rights embody
the relationship of one’s efforts and investment to reward and gain in terms of enhancing
personal utility, a relationship fundamental to the processes of production and exchange
in a market economy. In an ideal world of perfect information and zero transaction cost,
resource allocation is resolved independently of allocation of property rights (Coase,
1988). It is the imperfection of information and the inevitable existence of transaction
costs in real-world markets that motivate consideration of contract completeness as it
relates to industry specialization, comparative advantage, and trade structure.
Contract Completeness
The basic premise of the “Grossman-Hart-Moore contract incompleteness
framework” (GHM framework) implies that the practical inability to completely specify,
a priori, the terms and conditions of exchange leads to underinvestment and inefficient
outcomes (Hart and Moore, 1999). The GHM framework has a theoretical foundation
based on the idea that complete specification of all contingencies in a contract is all but
impossible, that all contracts are necessarily incomplete, and that effective contracts are
subject to ongoing renegotiation in order to be executed (fully performed by all parties to
the agreement). Since complete contract specification covering all possible contingencies
is prohibitively expensive and time-consuming, lacunae or gaps in incomplete contracts
are covered by default rules of the legal system in the applicable jurisdiction. Mandatory
contracting rules in a legal system are expressly stated; default rules are implied and close
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gaps: greater robustness of default rules implies less risk, more optimum investment, and
greater productivity.
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CHAPTER III - MODELING THE RELATIONSHIP OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EXPORTS
Economic output is modeled as a function of factors in production functions
(Mishra, 2007). Typical production functions of the Cobb-Douglass form model output
as a product of the proportion of output allocated to capital and the proportion of output
allocated to labor (Equation 4).
𝑌 = 𝐾 𝛼 𝐿1−𝛼

Equation 4

Variable Y represents the total output of all industries, variable K represents the
total amount of capital, and L represents the total amount of labor. Jones (2002)
introduces an additional variable to the production function that relates the effect of “an
economy’s social structure on the productivity of its inputs” (147) as shown in Equation
5.
𝑌 = 𝐼𝐾 𝛼 𝐿1−𝛼

Equation 5

The variable I represents the influence of “social structure” on the capital and
labor production factors. Depending on its value, the parameter I can augment (I > 1) or
debilitate (I < 1) the combined effect of capital and labor inputs on output. How the
“social structure” variable is conceptualized is critical to understanding its link with
production capabilities and trade outcomes. Hall and Jones (1999) define social
infrastructure (a synonym for social structure) as institutions and government policies.
Institutions of law and property rights can be conceptualized as a form of technology that
represents the “social structure” factor given in Equation 4. Output is moderated by
endowments of capital and labor and importantly, institutional constraints on whether or
not and how productively these inputs can be combined. While total output, Y, is a
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function of the magnitude of the proportion of output allocated to capital, Kα, and the
proportion of output allocated to labor, L1-α, the composition of output – what kinds of
products or goods that are produced – is not captured by the product of capital and labor
alone. More complex industries are more capital intensive and require larger ratios of
capital to labor. These kinds of production functions are often used to model the total
output of an economy. The same equation can be used to model the input and output of a
particular industry where Kα and L1-α represent the allocations of capital and labor to
outputs in that industry. The outputs of particular industries in a given economy
determines the cell values in the matrices that Hausmann, et al (2011) use to calculate
economic complexity. A sufficiently diminutive value of I implies that productivity is
insufficient for the industry to develop a comparative advantage, so the cell variable
representing exports for that industry will be zero in the matrix.
Modeling the relationship of property rights and exports is straight-forward given
the assumptions that exports are a function of production capabilities which are based on
alternative ways to configure capital and labor resources (technology), in addition to
magnitude and quality of capital and labor resources. A measure of exports is the
outcome, or dependent variable, and measures of capital and labor resources, and
technology are explanatory, independent variables. Property rights, which affect the
application of capital and labor resources in the production process as described above,
proxy for technology in this model. Changes in total production output reflect changes in
production capabilities and in the volume and types of goods produced in an economy.
Since entrepreneurs and firms are the ultimate decision-makers regarding allocation of
personal and other capital and labor resources, it is prudent to consider the consolidated
41

effect of the entire body of law, and property rights in particular, on entrepreneurial
decision-making. Individuals’ and firms’ perceptions of whether or not, and how much,
their country’s institutions incent allocation of personal resources to entrepreneurship and
enable reallocation of other resources, can be represented as a key independent
explanatory variable along with the capital and labor in a parsimonious, first
approximation model, as represented in Equation 5, to estimate industry diversity, and by
extension, export complexity.
Positive measures exist for gauging the facility with which individuals may
undertake to start and operate a new business. The Ease of Doing Business measures
(World Bank Ease of Doing Business Database,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx; accessed June 30, 2016) are good
candidates to be entrepreneurship enablement or entrepreneurial effectiveness proxies.
These measures reflect entrepreneurial effectiveness in terms of how long it takes, and
how expensive it is, to get a government permit or license to operate a business, and other
metrics regarding employing workers, registering property, securing credit, protection of
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and closing a
business (including bankruptcy procedures). An individual’s choice to allocate personal
resources to start and run a new business depends, in part, on a country’s system of law
or legal climate (whether formal or informal) regarding the cost and resources of setting
up and operating a new business. Entrepreneurial effectiveness, as measured using the
Ease of Doing Business index, can serve as a proxy for the actual effect of property rights
on conditions that enable creation of new industries. Effective entrepreneurs develop
enhanced production and export capabilities to create new types of goods and increase
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the number of higher value-added goods. From the argument given, entrepreneurial
effectiveness (ee) is also a function of property rights and may influence the production
factors that determine export outcomes thus bolstering the contended relationship
between property rights and export structure.
The preliminary regression formulation, based on the form of Equation 5,
evaluates the impact of capital and labor endowments and the overall system of law on
export complexity (Equation 6).
𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = β0 + β1 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + β1 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + β3 𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + β4 𝛸𝑖,𝑡 + ε

Equation 6

The variables k and l represents capital and labor, lsspr represents a summary
index of legal system quality and security of property rights, ec represents export
complexity, Χ is a vector of control variables, and ε is an error term. This regression
model relates the complexity of exports for country i in year t with the product of capital
and labor resources and system of law measures for the corresponding year. The main
explanatory measure in the primary regression model (lsspr) is a composite index that
encompasses nine sub-indices related to property rights as described earlier. A control
variable hypothesized to contribute to variation in economic complexity is the type of
legal tradition: civil law (cv), common law (co), Muslim (m), or mixed (mx). Legal
tradition reflects the combined influences of indigenous cultural development, conquest,
and colonization (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). Aside from conjectured significant
effects, no specific hypotheses relating legal tradition to level of economic complexity is
put forward due to the likelihood of idiosyncratic influences of the combination of formal
and informal aspects of legal tradition on economic system outcomes. The preliminary
model is extended to the primary regression model which is constructed to determine
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which sub-indices are salient in determining trade outcomes. Legal tradition variables in
the model are tested using an F test of multiple linear restrictions to determine if they are
jointly significant (Wooldridge, 2009). The regression model shown in Equation 7 is
proposed to explore the hypothesis that certain aspects of a country’s system of law
(concerning property rights in particular) in conjunction with endowment factors, have a
greater impact than others on trade outcomes.
𝑒𝑐𝑖,𝑡 = β0 + β1 𝑘𝑖,𝑡 + β2 𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + β3 𝑗𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + β4 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +
β5 𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + Β6 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 +β7 𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + β8 𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + β9 𝑟𝑐𝑠𝑟𝑝𝑖,𝑡 +
β10 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑡 + β11 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + Β12 𝑐𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + β13 𝑐𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + β14 𝑚𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + ε

Equation 7

The composite index if the index represents a linear combination of the variables
judicial independence (judind), impartiality of courts (impcts), protection of property
rights (pprts), military interference in rule of law and the political process (milint),
integrity of the legal system (lsint), legal enforcement of contracts (lecon), regulatory
costs for the sale of real property (rcsrp), reliability of police (relpol), and business cost
of crime (buscc). Systems of law and property rights change and develop over extended
periods of time. As mentioned above, this study does not attempt to assess the
longitudinal impact of changes in trade outcomes due to changes in property rights.
Rates of change are likely to be idiosyncratic and involve lag intervals of varying
duration based on many other political, economic, demographic, and geographic factors
(Roland, 2004; Kingston and Caballero, 2008). In order to focus on the differences in
trade outcomes between countries as a consequence of differing property rights
institutions, a between-groups regression design is proposed. Mean values for dependent
and independent variables representing several years of property rights, endowment, and
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trade data for each country are compared with one another to yield between-country
differences.
Incorporating additional terms into the model must be done judiciously to avoid
confounding in interpretation of effects. The pervasiveness of property rights in society
simultaneously and idiosyncratically affects form of governance, development of
production-enabling infrastructure, and other factors that inform and temper decisions by
individuals and firms regarding application of capital and labor resources in the
production process. Parsimony dictates the exclusion of these potentially confounding
factors from the regression model because controlling for these factors will obviate
effects of the principal explanatory variables of property rights and factor endowment.
Anticipated regression estimation results include statistically significant coefficients for
protection of property rights, pprts, and perhaps some combination of sub-index factors
in Equation 7. It is conjectured that some combination of sub-index factors will be found
jointly significant, along with capital and labor endowment, in predicting economic
complexity export outcomes.
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CHAPTER IV - EMPIRICAL TEST
Between-subjects, ordinary least squares linear regression procedures are
employed to estimate the parameters identified in the model described in Chapter 3. The
study includes data from one-hundred-nine subject countries as shown in Appendix A.
The countries included in the study represent a diverse cross-section of geographic areas
and distinct social, political, and economic systems. Although the United Nations
recognizes approximately 203 different countries, many of the countries are very small
and are engaged in minimal trade. The bulk of international trade occurs among a
relatively small number of countries. The cross-sectional data set is comprised of nine
years from 2005 through 2013. Although it is assumed that the regression model is wellspecified and that no systematic bias is introduced in the model due to the exclusion of
data for some countries and some years, all the theoretical requirements of regression
analysis are tested for verification.
Data Statistics and Model Assumptions
Data from a subset of countries in the global economy is used for the study,
however, it is assumed that the available data is a random sample of possible outcomes.
Data for all regression tests are obtained from 890 observations representing 109
countries. The countries represent diverse populations (very large, and very small),
multiple economic development strata (ranging from less-developed to highlydeveloped), broad geographic span, and a wide range of political systems including for
example, various forms of democracy, socialism, and totalitarian authority. Data
description and source details are contained in Appendix C for each variable employed in
the empirical analysis. Definition of the dependent variable economic complexity, as
46

described in Chapter 2, is based on the work of Hausmann and Hidalgo (2012). Sample
summary statistics for economic complexity (ec) are shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Sample Statistics for Economic Complexity Variable.
Measure

Variable Name

Mean

ec

0.058

Economic
Complexity

Standard
Deviation
1.007

Minimum Maximum Range
-2.09

2.36

4.45

Definition of attributes of country legal systems are sourced from the Economic
Freedom of the World organization based on work by Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson
(2012). Current data is obtained from a database on the website http://efwdata.com/.
Nine sub-indices related to a country’s system of law and property rights are among the
independent variables in this study. Values of indices range from 1 (strength/scope is
low) to 10 (strength/scope is high). Sample summary statistics for each of these subindices are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Sample Statistics for Legal System and Property Rights Sub-indices.
Measure
Judicial
Independence
Impartial Courts
Protection of
Property
Rights
Military
Interference
Legal System
Integrity
Legal Enforcement
of Contracts

Variable
Name
judind

Mean

impcts
pprts

4.65
5.88

1.63
1.69

1.05
1.56

8.04
9.10

6.99
7.54

milint

6.94

2.49

0.83

10.0

9.17

lsint

6.44

2.03

2.59

10.0

7.41

lecon

4.69

1.59

0.0

8.10

8.10

5.03

Standard Minimum Maximum Range
Deviation
2.21
0.56
9.40
8.84
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Regulatory Cost of
Real
Property
Exchange
Reliability of
Police
Business Cost of
Crime

rcsrp

7.46

1.66

2.55

9.96

7.41

relpol

5.54

1.91

1.66

9.46

7.80

buscc

5.99

1.83

1.57

9.47

7.90

The production factor variables include gross capital formation (k) and labor (l).
The natural logarithm of population is used as proxy for a country’s labor force since
accuracy and/or availability of data for working age population and workforce
participation rates are questionable for many of the countries included in the study.
Values of gross capital formation and population are obtained from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Sample summary statistics for the
production factor variables are is shown in Table 3 with capital values shown in units of
billions.
Table 3
Sample Statistics for the Production Factor Variables.
Measure
Capital
Labor

Variable Mean
Name
k
113
l
16.599

Standard
Deviation
33.2
1.442

Minimum Maximum
1.03
14.048

2820
21.009

Range
2818.97
7.042

Legal tradition is a nominal measure sourced from Canada’s University of Ottawa
JuriGlobe Research Group. A set of binary variables indicates whether or not a country’s
system of law is primarily based on common law (co), civil law (cv), Muslim law (m), or
is some mix of civil law, common law, Muslim law, or customary law (mx). Binary
variables for multiple nominal categories of legal tradition (civil, common, Muslim, and
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mixed) are constructed using a “dummy coding” process as shown in Table 4 with the
Muslim category as the base group.
Table 4
Dummy Coding Scheme for Legal Tradition Analysis
Legal Tradition
Common
Civil
Mixed
Muslim

Nominal
Category
1
2
3
4

Common
(cv)
1
0
0
0

Civil
(co)
0
1
0
0

Mixed
(mx)
0
0
1
0

The number of countries and their legal tradition variables are shown in Table 5.
The specific combination of legal traditions for each of the 54 countries with mixed
systems is provided in Appendix B. A single country in the sample, Saudi Arabia, has a
legal system based purely on Muslim law. All other systems are either common law or
civil law mono-systems, or are some combination of common law, civil law, customary
law, and Muslim law.
Table 5
Sample Information for Legal Tradition Binary Variables.
Legal
Tradition
Common
Civil
Muslim
Mixed

Variable
Name
co
cv
m
mx

Number of
Countries
8
54
1
46

Perfect collinearity among variables is not evident, although there are moderate to high
correlations (Pearson r ≥ 0.70) among some variables as shown in the emboldened
figures in Table 6. Such correlation values indicate multicollinearity among independent
variables.
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Table 6
Pair-wise Correlation Coefficients among Variables
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ec
ec
1.0
k
0.35
l
0.01
judindd 0.54
impcts 0.45
pprts
0.61
milint
0.60
lsint
0.58
lecon
0.49
rcsrp
0.36
relpol
0.56
buscc
0.47
ee
0.73

k
1.0
0.48
0.20
0.20
0.23
0.07
0.21
0.27
0.15
0.25
0.09
0.27

l

judind

impcts pprts milint lsint lecon rrsrp relpol buscc ee

d
1.00
-0.13
-0.11
-0.16
-0.28
-0.15
-0.04
-0.10
-0.14
-0.19
-0.20

1.0
0.94
0.92
0.59
0.69
0.39
0.27
0.85
0.59
0.70

1.0
0.91
0.50
0.65
0.41
0.27
0.85
0.59
0.74

1.0
0.59
0.73
0.41
0.27
0.87
0.63
0.78

1.0
0.56
0.43
0.32
0.57
0.43
0.64

1.0
0.56
0.31
0.79
0.81
0.65
5

1.0
0.53
0.46
0.47
0.63

1.0
0.31
0.24
0.54

1.0
0.78
0.71

1.0
0.49

1.0

Between Subjects Time-Series Cross-Sectional Regression Approach
The statistical analysis is based on a method that fits cross-sectional time-series
regression models (Beck, 2008). Worral and Pratt (2004) describe the TSCS model and
comprehensively address estimation issues associated with this method including
heterogeneity, autocorrelation, panel heteroskedasticity, non-stationarity, unit-specific
trends, spatial autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation, concluding that
“panel/TSCS data are well-suited to the detection of population heterogeneity (timestable characteristics of the units of analysis…” (36). Equation 8 illustrates the general
TSCS model.
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = β 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ; i = 1,…,N; t = 1,…,T

Equation 8

In Equation 8, y and x are respectively vectors of dependent and independent
variables indexed by unit (i) and time (t), and an error term structure assumed to be
independent for all i and t. The TSCS model adds vectors or dummy variables
representing unit and time resulting in a two-way fixed-effects model that distinguishes
“time-invariant differences between units and unit-invariant differences between time
periods” (36). Variation in economic complexity between countries rather than across
years for a given country is the focus of the study according to the rationale described in
previous chapters. Changes in legal system institutions vary slowly over time, so
longitudinal changes are not expected over the course of the span of years considered in
this study. The TSCS method implements a regression on group means (aggregating data
for each country for all years together) to assess and distinguish variation in economic
complexity due to between-country differences from those due to within-country
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differences. All variable values are converted to standard scores to generate beta
coefficients to allow for comparison of effects of explanatory variables on economic
complexity.
Results
Results of the between-countries regression formulation are shown in Equation 9
which regresses economic complexity against production factor variables, the nine legal
attribute sub-indices, and legal tradition (common, civil, and mixed). Estimated standard
error terms are shown in parentheses below the respective estimated parameter values.
Regression result tables are presented in Appendix D.
𝑒𝑐
̂ = -1.021+ 0.217 k + 0.112 l + 0.335 judind – 0.545 impcts +
(0.629) (0.078) (0.073) (0.202)
(0.207)
0.685 pprts + 0.180 milint + 0.074 lsint + 0.027 lecon +
(0.175)
(0.087)
(0.124)
(0.086)
0.062 rcsrp – 0.154 relpol + 0.143 buscc + 0.564 co + 1.348 cv +
(0.072)
(0.168)
(0.125)
(0.684)
(0.637)
0.738 mx
(0.637)

Equation 9

In Equation 9, ec is the economic complexity variable, k is capital, l is labor,
judind is judicial independence, impcts is impartial courts, pprts is protection of property
rights, milint is military interference, lsint is legal system integrity, lecon is legal
enforcement of contracts, rcsrp, is regulatory cost of sale of real property, relpol is
reliability of police, buscc is the business cost of crime, co is common legal tradition, cv
is civil legal tradition, and mx is mixed legal tradition. The test of overall significance for
the regression yields an F (14,94) value of 15.02 with less than 0.00% probability of
obtaining outcome as a result of chance. The R-squared value is 0.6910, and the adjusted
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R-squared value is 0.6450. The R-squared value indicates that the explanatory variables
account for over 69% of the variation in economic complexity in this model.
Significance levels for explanatory coefficients are capital (p = 0.007), labor (p = 0.131),
judicial independence (p = 0.101), impartial courts (p = 0.010), protection of property
rights (p < 0.000), legal enforcement of contracts (p = 0.757), integrity of legal system (p
= 0.552), military interference (p = 0.041), regulatory cost for sale of real property (p =
0.396), reliability of police (p = 0.362), business cost of crime (p = 0.254), common legal
tradition (p = 0.412), civil legal tradition (p = 0.037), mixed legal tradition (p = 0.249),
and the y-intercept (p = 0.108). Only the civil legal tradition dummy variable is
individually significant. The unexpected outcome of a negative, significant effect of
impartiality of courts on economic complexity is addressed further on in this section.
Property rights has the most pronounced effect among the independent variables on
economic complexity (beta coefficient = 0.685, probability < 0.000): a change of one
standard deviation in property rights is associated with a 0.685 standard deviation change
in economic complexity. The beta coefficient of the impartial courts (the only other legal
system attribute showing significance) is -0.545 (p = 0.010) suggesting a slightly less
impact in terms of absolute magnitude on economic complexity with respect to property
rights.
A post-estimation scatter plot of residuals for the regression model is shown in
Figure 1. The spread of points in the plot gives some evidence of homoskedasticity of
the error term but is not conclusive. Formal testing of heteroscedasticity is presented
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below. Regression post-estimation assessments for heteroscedasticity and omitted
variables are conducted for each subsequent model as well.

Figure 1. Post-estimation plot of residual values.
The null hypothesis of constant variance in the error term is tested with the
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity for the fitted values of the
economic complexity variable. A chi-square value of less than 0.01 with a 95.3%
probability of outcome as a result of random process implies that the null hypothesis of
constant variance should not be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of presence
of heteroscedasticity in the error term. Results of the Ramsey regression specificationerror test (RESET) test for non-linearities, specifically powers of independent variables,
imply that the null hypothesis that the model has no omitted variables should not be
rejected: F3,91 = 1.96 (with 0.09% probability of outcome as a result of chance).
Subsequent material in this section will systematically deal with (a) whether or
not legal tradition variables are jointly insignificant, (b) identifying legal attributes
essential to a parsimonious model, (c) the unanticipated finding of a negative, significant
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relationship of impartiality of courts and economic complexity, and (d) exploration of a
non-normative proxy variable for property rights in the regression model. Additional
regression models and refinements are proposed and tested to further support the
hypothesized relationship of property rights and export outcomes.
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CHAPTER V - DISCUSSION
Empirical analysis of trade data and country legal systems appears to offer
support for the hypothesis that property rights influence composition of exports.
Measures of strength and scope of property rights in a country consistently show a
significant relationship with measures of export complexity in that country. Holding
other variables constant, an increase in one standard deviation in property rights is
associated with an increase of one-third to two-thirds standard deviation in economic
complexity value. The set of variables in the model, including property rights,
production factors, and legal tradition, account for approximately 70% of the variation in
economic complexity for the set of 109 countries included in the study. The capital
variable shows a consistent, statistically significant effect on economic complexity in all
models tested, whereas the labor variable shows a significant effect in some models but a
statistically not significant effect on economic complexity in other models. The variables
representing legal tradition are shown to be jointly statistically significant and a necessary
component of a model explaining export outcomes. An explanation is provided for the
significant, negative relationship of impartiality of courts with economic complexity. An
interaction effect of impartiality of courts and property rights is modeled and found to be
significant. The variable representing military interference in rule of law and the political
process shows a significant, but moderate effect on economic complexity as compared
with other legal system attributes that were statistically significant. Assumptions are
tested for the time-series cross-sectional regression models to verify that the required
conditions are met.
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The present study is imperfect and incomplete and is subject to potential criticism
on the merits of its theoretical arguments, empirical models, assumptions, and hence its
conclusions. It is appropriate to address these potential criticisms directly for the sake of
encouraging improvements and extensions to the study in future research. Appropriate
topics for further discussion include improvements of theoretical foundations of the
models, the inchoate nature of property rights, omission of potential explanatory
variables, possible obfuscation due to entrepôt trade which is re-export of imported goods
with or without modification, level of trade aggregation, omission of service sector, and
data source bias. More topics include the extended period of longitudinal changes in
institutions, and consideration of other factors (barriers to trade, demand structure,
proximity) that could improve the explanatory power of the model. The possibility of
counter-example case studies, i.e., instances of consistent increases in property rights
protection concurrent with consistent decreases in measures of economic complexity, and
vice versa could also prove problematic to the arguments presented in this study.
Drawing a connection between such disparate subjects as property rights and
trade is daunting given the paucity of existing theory to support such a link. Few
empirical studies address the relationship of property rights and trade directly, even fewer
incorporate specific measures of property rights, and most do not use complexity of
exports as the dependent variable. Nevertheless, an attempt is made in early chapters to
bridge the gap by appealing to a set of intermediating variables which together articulate
a logical, causal chain between the strength and scope of laws that protect property rights
and the composition of a country’s export product space. The rationale of comparative
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advantage and factor proportions trade theories is considered axiomatic. Institutional
economics theory adds measures of formal and informal property rights rules to
production factor variables in comparative advantage trade theory. These rules are
hypothesized to incent and govern interpersonal or social transactions related to
production. This study proposes that variation in protection of property rights among
countries constitutes the institutional differences that contribute to technological
differences that, along with production factors (capital and labor), explain composition of
exports. To summarize, the subject of property rights is inherently broad and multifaceted, especially as it has been conceived in this study. Property is defined as anything,
tangible or intangible, that is subject to ownership, control, use, and exchange. Property
rights are defined as the rules by which property is defined, used, exchanged, and
litigated in the case of disputes. Measures of property rights used in this study are
synthetic indices, analytically derived from several primary sources. Production is
defined as the process of exercising property rights to marshal and apply capital and labor
factors to transform inputs into output. New goods and new industries are created by
developing and configuring resources for productive purposes. What industries are
developed, which goods are produced, and in what production domains a country can
develop a comparative advantage are the result of economic decision makers
(entrepreneurs, producers, and investors) making choices concerning production
organization and depending on availability of natural resources. Production organization
decisions are made by individuals and firms. The presented argument is established on
the basic, albeit arguably disputable, microeconomic concepts of utility maximizing self58

interested individuals and firms, entities whose behavior is responsive to incentives
directly related to prevailing formal and informal institutions of property rights. Since
export presumes production, and production is a function of input and output, the analysis
begins with the production function that relates capital and labor inputs to production
yield. The production function is augmented by a factor that attempts to explain the
substantial discrepancy between amount of output accounted for by capital and labor
inputs, and the total actual output of a given production system.
Measures of total factor productivity (TFP) – what Kuznets (1973) calls “a
measure of our ignorance” – are used to quantify the gap between economic output
expected from theoretical models and empirically-observed output. Solow (1957)
attributed differences in economic growth to factors of labor and capital, but could not
account for the bulk of differences between countries on these measures, postulating that
over 80% of the differences were due to some measure of technology. The unexplained
differences in growth were subsequently called “Solow’s Residual,” an example of a TFP
measure. Solow’s theories are extended by Mankiw, Romer, and Weill (1990) to include
an additional factor called “human capital,” as measured by educational attainment for
example, to account for differences between countries in economic growth. Next,
researchers devised the concept of “social capital” which focuses on differences between
countries in how well their citizens formed the kinds of social networks required for
developing more productive and competitive economic output capabilities (Burt, 2009).
Together these theories remain incomplete, however, in that they address the “proximate”
causes of differences in economic outcomes, not the “ultimate” causes. Studies of trade
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structure, for example Adam Smith’s mid-18th century theories, often cite technological
differences between countries as a distinguishing factor, but fail to specify the causes of
the technological differences. If it is assumed that countries vary in growth and
prosperity due to differences in technology, educational attainment and other human
capital measures, or social capital, what causes the differences in technology, human
capital, and social capital in the first place? Posited here is that property rights
institutions, a form of “social technology,” is an essential variable for explaining total
factor productivity and the observed differences between countries in production
capabilities, trade, and ultimately, a country’s pattern of economic growth and
development (Hidalgo, 2016). Testing the hypothesis linking property rights and exports
requires defining and measuring relevant dependent and independent variables and
formulating a model that describes the relationship between the variables.
There are many ways to measure trade: by content (types of goods), by volume
(magnitude in terms of units), by value (by purchase price for example or other valuation
method), by direction (who imports what from whom and who exports what to whom),
by distance (from exporter location to importer location), by terms of trade, and probably
others. While not necessarily reflecting a continuum, it appears that the types of goods a
country exports, in terms of measures of economic complexity (diversity and ubiquity),
can reliability predict future economic growth over a 10 to 15 year period (Hidalgo,
2016). Measures of economic complexity are chosen for the present study because they
reflect a country’s production capabilities which, it is argued, is regulated by prevailing
system of property rights. Assessing complexity of goods other than by the method of
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diversity and ubiquity matrices is problematic due to the inordinate number of diverse
products and non-standardized, normative, and subjective techniques of assessment.
Another issue, to which the data in this study is subject, is finding an appropriate level of
aggregation or dis-aggregation of categories or classes of goods. The U.S. International
Trade Commission’s Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) delineates over 17,000 unique
product identifiers at the lowest level of aggregation. Goods may be categorized by
sector, for example manufacturing, agriculture, primary goods, or services, by industry,
for example, transportation, energy, and information technology, by level of complexity,
and by the set of capabilities required for their production. Results of the study may be
influenced by other factors including the prevalence of entrepôt exchange, or trade in
intermediate goods, and the possible inaccuracies in government-provided summaries of
imports and exports.
Property rights is no less difficult to define and measure. Concrete measures such
as rules and statutes expressed or implied in constitutional documents often do not reflect
the intent or outcome of the rules in the actual practice of a legal system. For example,
despite Chinese government statements to the contrary, as well as the liberal and
progressive verbiage found in the Constitution of the People’s Republic,1 individual
rights present in many other countries appear to be lacking in China, a country inhabited
by one-fifth of the world’s population. Even if a robust taxonomy of property rights
existed, an exhaustive catalog of positive measures of each country’s legal system

1

See for example, the following articles in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China – 2: “all power in the PRC belongs to
the people”; 3: “national and local congresses at different levels are instituted through democratic election”; 35: “Citizens of the PRC
enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration”; 48: “Women in the PRC
enjoy equal rights with men in all spheres of life, political, economic, cultural and social, and family life.”
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statutes, laws, rules, and regulations is requisite to conduct a study of statistical
generalization. Such an analysis would also require measures of discrepancies between
codified law and law-in-practice. Short of efforts to produce such comparative data on
property rights, pertinent studies rely on existing measures such as those chosen for this
study.
Legal system attribute measures from Gwartney, et al. (2012) are provided as a
single composite index for each country representing the mean value nine sub-indices.
Although not shown in the Results section, a regression of the composite index together
with labor and legal tradition shows statistical significance (standardized coefficient =
0.689 probability < 0.000) for the index on economic complexity (F5,103 = 29.11
probability < 0.000). The coefficient of determination (R-squared) for this model
indicates that the composite index together with capital, labor, and legal tradition account
for over 58% of the variation in economic complexity. Rationale given in previous
chapters establishes the logical connection of differences between countries in production
choices, comparative advantage, and export composition due, in the main, to differences
in the countries’ property rights institutions. Hence, the thrust of refinement in empirical
analysis is one of parsing out ancillary factors. The effects of property rights institutions
are pervasive. Inclusion of other variables may improve the explanatory power of
production decisions and export outcomes, but is not justified by theory. That the legal
system attributes are subsidiary to, or in effect derivative of, protection of property rights
is argued above. Variation in incentive structure implied by strength or weakness of
property rights protections is the ultimate cause of decisions by individuals and firms
62

with respect to production choices and whether new industries, and therefore new
opportunities to develop a comparative advantage, are more or less forthcoming in a
given country. The facts that court impartiality and military interference variables are
also found to significantly affect economic complexity may be due to chance. The
direction of effect of the former is contrary to expectations. No theoretical justification
for inclusion of either variable in a parsimonious, conclusive model can be proffered
aside from increasing the amount of variation in economic complexity explained.
Impartiality of courts is found to be negatively, and significantly related to economic
complexity. An interaction term is modeled and tested resulting in confirmation of the
significance of an interaction term between property rights protection and court
impartiality on economic complexity. Additional evidence is required to confirm that
courts may act contrary to established law regarding protection of property rights to give
credence to this hypothesis. The previous discussion underscores the need for further
development of a theory and empirical study establishing the relationships among legal
system attributes especially with regard to the centrality of property rights protections.
Skaaning (2010) highlights the difficulty in measuring legal institution quality in
a comparative analysis of seven normative rule-of-law indices including the Bertelsmann
Transformation Index (BTI), the Freedom House legal system (FW), the Global Integrity
Index (GII), the International Country Risk Guide index (PRS), and the Worldwide
Governance Indicators index (WGI) produced by Kaufmann, Kray, and Mastruzzi
(2010). Significant differences between measures exist in all facets studied in regard to
“conceptualization, measurement, aggregation, and association with theoretically related
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variables” (ibid: 458). The conclusion from Skanning (2010) is not surprising given the
breadth and complexity of the attributes of legal institutions described above, and gives
impetus to a quest for variables that represent effects of legal system attributes, such as
entrepreneurial effectiveness. The reader may question the possibility of bias in legal
attribute measures that originate from researchers associated with The Heritage
Foundation, an organization whose mission is “… to formulate and promote conservative
public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual
freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense” (http://www.
heritage.org/about/our-history/about-the-heritage-foundation). The details of the
methodology description provided in the Heritage Foundation’s website, however, may
allay this concern given the rigor of definition of property rights and the breadth of
sources, both private and governmental, from which assessments of legal system
attributes were systematically formulated (Beach and Kane, 2007).
Legal tradition is shown to affect export complexity. Differences in legal
traditions are many and varied, as described in previous chapters. Type of legal tradition
– common, civil, or mixed – appeared to be an important variable, but interpretation of
the effects is challenging due to differences in conceptualizations and measures of legal
tradition. The explanatory power of legal tradition in regard to economic outcomes,
including trade, is further complicated by the facts that legal systems of countries are not
based purely on common, civil, customary, Islamic, or Talmudic tradition, and that most
systems of law in a country consist of various combinations or mixes of these traditions.
La Porta, et al. 2008 conclude that differences in legal tradition – these authors use the
64

phrase “legal origin” – influences types of laws and regulations, that civil law emphasizes
policy implementation while common law focuses on supporting market activity, and that
differences in laws and regulations have a significant effect on “economic and social
outcomes” (326). In addition, these authors suggest that diverse country legal systems
may be converging to similar sets of rules and regulations. An understanding of the
effects of legal tradition on economic and trade outcomes may benefit from comparing
countries with different mixes of traditions, for example, common plus customary or civil
plus customary, in contrast to countries with common or civil mono-systems. Notable is
the imbalance of legal tradition among countries of the world, an imbalance reflected in
the study’s sample: eight common law, fifty-four civil law, one Muslim, and forty-six
mixed systems. The question of how countries came to adopt certain legal traditions is
far afield from this study’s scope, but one whose answers may yield insight for further
investigation. Although property rights are considered the fundamental social force
impacting production decisions, new industry creation, and exports in this study, systems
of law originate and develop from cultural, historical, and geographic factors that are well
beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say that ultimate causes of all human social
behavior arise as a result of the confluence of fundamental principles of psychology,
biology, chemistry, and physics operating in the context of a highly-interconnected global
ecosystem. Research on the effects of legal tradition on trade outcomes will benefit also
from development of theoretical postulates that identify and link specific aspects of legal
traditions or combinations of legal traditions to entrepreneurial behavior, production
processes, and subsequent export outcomes.
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An implication of the relation of property rights and exports is that changes in the
former beget changes in the latter. As mentioned earlier in this work, substantial changes
in social institutions such as systems of law and property rights generally occur over
periods of many years or decades at least. There are exceptions to this generality, for
example as described earlier, radical reform of property ownership in the Lenin era of
Russia and the post-Mao era of China. A corollary of the theory presented in this study is
that changes in protection of property rights will lead to changes in production
capabilities and export pattern, and that these changes should be measureable given a
sufficient period of time for changes to occur. Anecdotal evidence may support the
relationship, for example as in the case of concomitant decreases in economic complexity
with decreases in property rights protection measures from 2000 to 2013 in both
Venezuela and the United States. However, time-series tests of statistical generalization
including many countries over a sufficient interval are required to ascertain the strength
of the relationship of these variables. Lack of requisite data for enough countries over
enough years makes it difficult to conduct these studies presently.
There are a number of hypotheses regarding the longer-term trajectories that can
be expected of economic complexity and property rights measures for a country over
time. The trajectory of change in economic complexity and property rights for a country
may follow closely its path of economic development or the trajectories may “converge”
in a manner similar to the cross-country economic convergence outlined by Abramovitz
(1986). The trajectories of economic complexity and property rights in the collective of
countries in the global system may converge to a uniform level or may reach a plateau
66

over time. The positive trends in economic complexity and property rights may or may
not be reversible or path-dependent. The path may reflect a pattern of hysteresis where
trends of increase follow a different trajectory than trends of decrease. The level of
economic complexity may be “sticky upward” (analogous to “sticky-wage” and “sticky
price” concepts) such that higher levels of economic complexity are reticent to decrease
despite decreases in precipitating factors such as level of protection of property rights.
Once capabilities for production are developed, it may be less likely that rules that
promote entrepreneurship and diversity in production will be rescinded, unless governing
authorities impose onerous taxation policies, nationalize productive private industries, or
impose other forms of takings. The fortunes of countries may change substantially over
sufficient periods of time during which change in economic complexity and property
rights exhibits a positive or negative quadratic curve (rising and then falling, or falling
and then rising), or perhaps even a cubic or higher order function that begins to resemble
a cyclic oscillation over the very long term. It is helpful to keep in mind that the period
of industrialization is relatively nascent in the history of the development of mankind
which is dominated almost exclusively by agricultural production.
A useful theory of social behavior not only helps explain historical patterns, but to
some extent can be used to anticipate future behavior. If property rights influence
production and trade in the manner presented in this study, then changes in property
rights can aid in explaining changes in production and trade patterns. An example is
presented to illustrate the potential opportunities for case study analysis of the link
between changes in property rights and changes in production and export patterns. The
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7th Congress of the Cuban Communist Party introduced in April, 2016 proposed
regulations to legalize private sector small businesses (Weissenstein, Michael. 2016.
“Cuba to legalize small and medium-sized private businesses,” Associated Press, May 24,
2016. Accessed 6-22-2016 at:
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/a7038453c4234c1eb3bb026a355245d4/cuba-legalize-smalland-medium-sized-private-businesses.). Should the Cuban Parliament approve the
proposal in the latter half of 2016, private businesses will be allowed and, presumably,
will compete with or complement state-owned enterprises in the production of goods and
services in the small, island nation of 11 million inhabitants. In 2010, Cuba’s
government began lifting restrictions on individuals working for themselves instead of
for the state: “as much as a third of Cuba’s five million workers are now in the private
sector” (Althaus, Dudley. 2016. “Cuba to Legalize Small Businesses,” WSJ, May 25,
2016.). Unfortunately, property rights measures are not available for Cuba. The
economic complexity index for Cuba in 2009 is a relatively low -0.426. According the
arguments presented in this study, the result of changes in Cuba’s laws concerning
private enterprise and lifting of embargo restrictions on trade between near-neighbor
United States, should result in an increase in the relatively low current economic
complexity index. In other words, it is anticipated that new industries will be developed
in Cuba resulting in opportunities for developing a comparative advantage in more types
of exports and export of products of greater complexity.
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CHAPTER VI - CONCLUSION
Findings of the present study may justify efforts by government policy-makers or
a national electorate to inaugurate changes to systems of law and property rights that
promote opportunities to enhance the diversity of industries and goods exported by their
countries. However, the breadth and entrenched nature of prevailing social institutions
present challenges to the policy-maker. Once enacted, legislation of any type is difficult
to rescind or repeal, regardless of diminishing effectiveness, the appearance of adverse,
unintended consequences, and the patent disutility of obsolete rules and regulations
(Howard, 2014). In some ways, un-making an arcane and unproductive law is more
difficult than establishing laws in the first place. Suggestions to discard at one time
useful, but presently unproductive laws, include imposed “sunset” clauses when the law
is first instituted stipulating that it will expire on a certain future date unless reprovisioned. Another suggestion is to appoint special commissions to review and re-visit
sets of laws with the intent of simplifying, eliminating, or otherwise modifying them
based on current needs, budgets, and social requirements. These practical suggestions do
not obviate the enduring issue of special interest group influences and lobbying efforts to
which not even non-partisan special commissions are immune. Expectations of policymakers regarding the potential for making changes to property rights institutions that
extend production capabilities and export diversity can be informed by knowledge of how
systems of law and property rights change, possible trajectories of change in property
rights and economic complexity measures, and insight into the trade-off between public
and private interests due to bias in property rights.
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How Systems of Law and Property Rights Change
Changing a single rule, law, or statute regarding property rights is unlikely to
have a substantial impact on production and export patterns in the short-run unless the
scope of the change is sufficiently broad and radical such as the Emancipation
Proclamation that freed slaves in 19th century United States, Lenin’s 1917 Decree on
Land in Russia, China’s abolition of private property in 1949, or China’s legalization of
private property after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. Changes in property rights
institutions result from cumulative changes in type and scope of specific property rights
laws. These cumulative changes affect long-run production and export outcomes. Law is
an evolutionary phenomenon subject to abrupt departures from long-accepted norms as
well as to small, incremental additions, deletions, and modifications. The mechanisms of
change in systems of law depend on the form and functional aspects of governance in a
country. The process of legislative change in totalitarian states by fiat certainly differs
from the protracted intercourse of bicameral houses of congress, the often highly-spirited
debates among splintered parliamentary bodies, and the tug-of-war for power and control
between executive, judicial, and legislative branches of governance in presidential and
semi-presidential systems (Newton and Van Deth, 2005). Power is transferred among
political parties and factions in peaceful transitions and violent or non-violent coups
d’etat, as the result of domestic and international geo-political forces. Ultimately, the
role of government or commonwealth in society is to manage the production of public
goods and to ‘balance’ the interests of producers and consumers with the public interest
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by minimizing externalities resulting from production, consumption, and exchange
activities (Hobbes, 1982 [1651]).
Private Interests and Public Interests
Individual and public interests are difficult to isolate from one another because
their expression is both role- and circumstance-dependent. The public is constituted by
individuals, so the interests of individuals, groups, and the society as a whole are not
easily separated. Expressions of interests are role-specific. Individuals in a society
invariably assume multiple roles as economic agents: producers, consumers, investors,
laborers, policy-makers, and so forth. An economic agent engaging in a transaction with
another party expresses the interests, values, wants, and needs of the particular role the
agent assumes for the purposes of the particular transaction. Every individual possesses
interests that are particular to their person as well as interests that are particular to the
groups of which they are members (Smith, 1759). An individual may have an interest in
security for their own person and property as well as an interest in the security of others’
person and property because the individual wishes to exchange property with another for
personal gain. More concretely for example, one may desire unlimited access to use
timber from public land for heating one’s home, but may also desire that public
timberland be protected from complete depletion through over-harvesting by members of
the community. Societies invariably struggle with resource allocation decisions because
its members assume multiple, overlapping, nested and layered roles with corresponding
multiple, overlapping, nested, and layered sets of interests. It is in the realm of a
society’s political system that these interests are reconciled. A country’s political process
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is the forum through which decisions regarding priorities of economic productivity and
social welfare are made. Olson (1965) offers a theory of groups and organizations to
explain individual behavior with respect to the production and consumption of public
goods. The theory puts forth counter-intuitive, and perhaps controversial, conclusions for
example “…unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is
coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest,
rational self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group
interests” (2), and the “surprising tendency for the ‘exploitation’ of the great [majority]
by the small [minority]” (3). The latter appears to stand in contraposition to the central
theme of the writings of one observer of early American democracy regarding the
“tyranny of the majority” (de Tocqueville, 1984 [1835]).
Property Rights Bias
The strength and scope of a legal systems is inversely related to transaction costs,
Legal System Scope/Strength
Complex
Industry
Feasibility,
Export
Complexity,
Overall Economic
Performance

Institutional Bias,
Transaction
Costs,
Externalities,
Distortions

Private (Individual)
Figure 2. Property Rights Bias Continuum.

Public (Group)
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institutional bias, externalities, and distortions in an economic system, and is directly
related to the feasibility of complex industries, export complexity, and overall economic
performance (Figure 2). Systems of law and property rights tend to be biased towards
individual interests or group welfare, that is, interests of the general public. Externalities
associated with bias result in transaction costs that diminish economic efficiency and
raise opportunity costs. Consequently, systems of law and property rights that minimize
bias may result in greater productivity and efficiency by simultaneously optimizing
creative and productive entrepreneurial expression, allocating resources to their most
valued use, inducing standards-raising competition, and permitting unfettered
tâtonnement in the marketplace through the dynamic flow of price-mediated supply and
demand.
A system of law and property rights slanted excessively toward public purposes or
toward private interests can adversely affect the use of resources for maximizing
production of goods and services as shown in Figure 3. The scope and strength of a
country’s system of law is more or less broad and intensive, and a country’s property
rights are more or less biased towards private interests or public purposes. Strength and
scope of a country’s system of law is represented by the vertical axis of Figure 3 and can
be measured according to the institutional dimensions described by Fukuyama (2004)
who characterizes a country’s endowment of social infrastructure in terms of the strength
and scope of its institutions. Among his outline of fourteen elements of a state’s
institutional capacity are law and order, property rights, macroeconomic management,
education, and financial regulation. The strength and scope of capabilities associated
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with organizations associated with each of these elements reflect the quality of processes
associated with a country’s institutions. Property rights are inherently biased towards
individual interests at the expense of public interest, or towards public interests at the
expense of individual interests as represented by the horizontal axis of Figure 3. Bias
towards private interests implies the presence of negative externalities due to few
constraints on firms, individual entrepreneurs, self-serving public officials, and
insufficient investment in public infrastructure and other provisions for the public good.
Bias towards public purposes may be characterized by excessive takings that stifle
entrepreneurial initiative and cause other negative externalities. Bias of institutions
toward either extreme produces more externalities, higher transaction costs, and
inefficiency in terms of economic performance. Bias implies less capital accumulation,
lower levels of skilled human capital, fewer incentives for entrepreneurs to take risk, lessdeveloped commerce-enabling public infrastructure, and lower overall productivity.
Absence of institutional bias implies relatively greater levels of capital accumulation,
more investment and risk-taking by entrepreneurs to establish and grow businesses, the
availability of more government revenue for investment in public infrastructure, and
higher overall productivity. In sum, a country cannot use its resources efficiently if the
system of law and property rights inhibits the accumulation of capital, entrepreneurial
initiatives, and the development of both infrastructure and human capital. Inefficient use
of resources in an economy means the nation will underperform in terms of its production
possibilities. Institutional bias varies from industry to industry. Viability and levels of
productivity of complex industries are more sensitive to institutional bias than are
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viability and levels of productivity of simple industries. Since flow of trade is influenced
by relative levels of productivity between industries, factors such as a country’s system of
law and property rights affect trade structure.
“All the measures of the law should protect property and punish plunder,”
proclaimed Bastiat (1850) in his pointed mid-19th century polemic billed as a “blueprint
for a just society.” The perennial questions remain for the policy-maker, the producer,
and the consumer considering the calculus and economic outcomes of interest group
politics: Cui bono - who benefits, and cui plagalis – who pays? One person’s protection
may be another’s plunder. The rules of the game determine who pays and who benefits,
according to tenets of institutional economics. Study of the origins and course of
development of the rules of the game in societies is properly in the realm of political
science which concerns the causes and outcomes of power dynamics associated with
individual and group interests.
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APPENDIX A - Country Data Set
Following is the list of 109 countries employed in the data set which includes
country name, legal tradition, and number of years of data available for analysis.
Table A1.
Countries, Legal Tradition, and Years of Data.

Country
ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Country Name
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cote d'Ivoire
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland

Legal Tradition [include details
of mixed systems]
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Common
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Common
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Civil
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Number
Years of Data
9
9
3
9
9
9
9
1
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
2
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
6
9

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

France
Gabon
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon
Lithuania
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru

Civil
Mixed
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Civil
Common
Civil
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Common
Mixed
Civil
Common
Mixed
Mixed
Civil
Mixed
Mixed
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Mixed
Civil
Common
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Mixed
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Civil
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9
3
9
4
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
5
9
9
9
6
9
9
9
9
6
9
4
9
9
9
9
4
9
8
8
9
8
9
9
9
8
9
9
8
9
7
9
9

76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Serbia
Singapore
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tanzania
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela, RB
Vietnam
Zambia
Zimbabwe

Mixed
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Muslim
Mixed
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Mixed
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Mixed
Civil
Common
Mixed
Civil
Mixed
Civil
Mixed
Common
Common
Civil
Civil
Civil
Mixed
Mixed
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9
9
9
4
9
8
1
8
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
6
9
9
2
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9

APPENDIX B - Legal Systems of Countries in the Data Set

Table A2.
Legal systems and Country Count.
Legal System(s)

Number of
Countries
54
8
1
46
4
11
7
6
3
4
4
3
2

Civil (mono-system)
Common (mono-system)
Muslim (mono-system)
Mixed
Civil + Common
Civil + Customary
Civil + Muslim
Common + Customary
Common + Muslim
Civil + Muslim + Customary
Common + Muslim + Customary
Civil + Common + Customary
Common + Civil + Muslim +
Customary
Civil + Common + Jewish + Muslim
Muslim + Customary

1
1
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APPENDIX C - Dissertation Data Description and Sources

Table A3.
Variable Name, Type, Description and Source.

Name
ec

Type Description
DV
Export product space complexity index

lsspr

IV

Legal system & security of property
rights summary index

Legal System
judind

IV

impcts

IV

pr

IV

milint

IV

lsint

IV

Judicial independence: survey response
to the question "Is the judiciary in your
country independent from political
influences of members of government,
citizens or firms?"
Impartial courts: survey response to the
question: "The legal framework in your
country for private businesses to settle
disputes and challenge the legality of
government actions and/or regulations is
inefficient and subject to manipulation
or is efficient and follows a clear,
neutral process
Protection of property rights: survey
response to the question: "Property
rights, including over financial assets
are poorly defined and not protected by
law or are clearly defined and well
protected by law
Military interference in rule of law and
the political process
Integrity of the legal system

lecon

IV

Legal enforcement of contracts: “This
index is also a part of the Economic
Freedom of the World survey but it is
based on the World Bank’s Doing
Business estimates for the time and
capital required to collect a debt
(assumed to be 200% of the country’s
per-capita income). Two ratings from 0
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Source
Hausmann and
Hidalgo (2012)
Gwartney, Hall, and
Lawson (2012)
Gwartney, Hall, and
Lawson (2012)

Gwartney, Hall, and
Lawson (2012)

Gwartney, Hall, and
Lawson (2012)

Gwartney, Hall, and
Lawson (2012)
Gwartney, Hall, and
Lawson (2012)
Gwartney, Hall, and
Lawson (2012)

rcsrp

IV

relpol

IV

to 10 were structured and averaged to
obtain the index – the time cost,
measured in number of calendar days
from the filing of the lawsuit to the day
of payment and the capital cost,
measured as percentage of the debt.”
Regulatory restrictions on the sale of
real property
Reliability of police

buscc

IV

Business cost of crime

Ctrl

Population is based on the de facto
definition of population, “which counts
all residents regardless of legal status or
citizenship--except for refugees not
permanently settled in the country of
asylum, who are generally considered
part of the population of their country of
origin. The values shown are midyear
estimates.
(1) United Nations Population Division.
World Population Prospects, (2) United
Nations Statistical Division. Population
and Vital Statistics Report (various
years), (3) Census reports and other
statistical publications from national
statistical offices, (4) Eurostat:
Demographic Statistics, (5) Secretariat
of the Pacific Community: Statistics and
Demography Programme, and (6) U.S.
Census Bureau: International Database.”
Gross capital formation (constant 2005
USD) “Gross capital formation
(formerly gross domestic investment)
consists of outlays on additions to the
fixed assets of the economy plus net
changes in the level of inventories.
Fixed assets include land improvements
(fences, ditches, drains, and so on);
plant, machinery, and equipment
purchases; and the construction of roads,

Production
Factors
pop

k

Ctrl
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Gwartney, Hall, and
Lawson (2012)
Gwartney, Hall, and
Lawson (2012)
Gwartney, Hall, and
Lawson (2012)

World Bank World
Development Index
(WDI)

World Bank World
Development
Indicators Database

railways, and the like, including schools,
offices, hospitals, private residential
dwellings, and commercial and
industrial buildings. Inventories are
stocks of goods held by firms to meet
temporary or unexpected fluctuations in
production or sales, and "work in
progress." According to the 1993 SNA,
net acquisitions of valuables are also
considered capital formation.”
Additional
Measures
ee

IV

Entrepreneur effectiveness proxy
(average distance to frontier).
“The distance to frontier score aids in
assessing the absolute level of
regulatory performance and how it
improves over time. This measure
shows the distance of each economy to
the “frontier,” which represents the best
performance observed on each of the
indicators across all economies in
the Doing Business sample since 2005.
This allows users both to see the gap
between a particular economy’s
performance and the best performance
at any point in time and to assess the
absolute change in the economy’s
regulatory environment over time as
measured by Doing Business. An
economy’s distance to frontier is
reflected on a scale from 0 to 100,
where 0 represents the lowest
performance and 100 represents the
frontier. For example, a score of 75 in
DB 2014 means an economy was 25
percentage points away from the frontier
constructed from the best performances
across all economies and across time. A
score of 80 in DB 2015 would indicate
the economy is improving. In this way
the distance to frontier measure
complements the annual ease of doing
82

World Bank

business ranking, which compares
economies with one another at a point in
time.”
Entrepreneur
Effectiveness
Sub-metrics
Starting a
Business

Getting
Electricity

Registering
Property

Getting Credit

Protecting
Minority
Investors

Measures number of procedures to
legally start and operate a company, the
number of calendar days required to
complete each procedures, the cost
required to complete each procedure as
a percentage of income per capita, and
paid-in minimum capital as percentage
of income per capita.
Measures number of procedures to
obtain connection to an electrical utility,
the number of calendar days required to
complete each procedures, the cost
required to complete each procedure as
a percentage of income per capita, the
reliability of supply and transparency of
tariffs index (on a 0 to 8 scale), and the
price of electricity in cents per kilowatthour.
Measures the efficiency of transferring
property in terms of number of
procedures to legally transfer title on
immovable property, the number of
calendar days required to complete each
procedure, and the cost required to
complete each procedure as percentage
of the property value. Measures also
include the reliability, transparency, and
coverage of the land administration
system and protection against land
disputes.
Measures the strength of legal rights,
depth of credit information, credit
bureau coverage, and credit registry
coverage.
Measures extent of disclosure, extent of
shareholder rights, extent of director
liability, extent of ownership and
control, ease of shareholder suits, extent
83

Paying Taxes

Trading
Across
Borders
Enforcement
of Contracts

Resolving
Insolvency

of corporate transparency, extent of
conflict of interest regulation, extent of
shareholder governance, and overall
strength of minority investment
protection.
Measures total number of taxes and
contributions paid, including
consumption taxes (value added tax,
sales tax, or goods and services tax),
method and frequency of filing and
payment, hours per year required to
comply with three major taxes, and total
tax rate as a percentage of profit before
all taxes.
Measures documentary compliance,
border compliance, and domestic
transport.
Measures efficiency of resolving a
commercial contract dispute in terms of
number of calendar days required to
enforce a contract through the courts,
the cost required to enforce a contract
through the courts as a percentage of the
claim, and quality of the judicial process
(court structure and proceedings, case
management, court automation,
alternative dispute resolution, and
overall quality of the judicial process).
Measures recovery of debt in insolvency
in terms of years required to recover
debt, cost required to recover debt as a
percentage of debtor’s estate, outcome
(whether the business continues
operating as a going concern or whether
its assets are sold piecemeal), and the
recovery rate for secured creditors as
cents on the dollar; the recovery rate is a
function of the time, cost, and outcome
of insolvency proceedings against a
local company.
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APPENDIX D - Regression Results Tables

Following are regression tables generated by the statistical analysis for the four
main models evaluated in the analysis. For the time-series cross-section analysis, country
is declared as the panel variable and year is declared as the time variable. The population
variable, a proxy for labor, is transformed to natural logarithm. All the variables, except
for the legal tradition dummy binaries, were transformed to standardized z-scores.
Shown in Table A4 are the regression data for the base model (regressing economic
complexity on production factors, nine legal system sub-indices, and legal tradition).
Shown in Table A5 are the regression data for the streamlined model (regressing
economic complexity on production factors, a subset of the nine legal system sub-indices,
and legal tradition).
Shown in Table A6 are the regression data for the impartial courts interaction
model (regressing economic complexity on production factors, a subset of the nine legal
system sub-indices, an impartial courts/property rights interaction term, and legal
tradition).
Shown in Table A7 are the regression data for the entrepreneurial effectiveness
proxy model (regressing economic complexity on production factors, entrepreneurial
effectiveness, and legal tradition).
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Table A4.
Base Model Regression Results
Source
Model
Residual
Total

86

ecstd
lnpopstd
grcapfstd
judindstd
impctsstd
pprtsstd
relpolstd
lsintstd
leconstd
milintstd
rrsrpstd
busccstd
commom
civil
mixed
_cons

SS

df

74.6318359
33.3681642

14
94

108

108

Coef.
0.112059
0.2168076
0.3348911
-0.5451287
0.6850981
-0.1536941
0.074092
0.0265596
0.1796323
0.0616701
0.1432084
0.5640976
1.348099
0.7381232
-1.020769

Std. Err.
0.735498
.0783937
0.202163
0.2067061
0.1748105
0.1677939
0.124234
0.0856621
0.0868793
0.0723345
0.1247546
0.6845066
0.637507
0.6366019
0.6294184

MS

Number of obs =
F (14,94) =
5.33084542 Prob > F =
.35498047 R-Squared =
Adj R-squared =
1 Root MSE =
t
1.52
2.77
1.66
-2.64
3.92
-0.92
0.60
0.31
2.07
0.85
1.15
0.82
2.11
1.16
-1.62

P > |t|
0.131
0.007
0.101
0.010
0.000
0.362
0.552
0.757
0.041
0.396
0.254
0.412
0.037
0.249
0.108

[95% Conf. Int.]
-0.0339759
0.0611551
-0.665083
-0.9555485
0.3380076
-0.4868528
-0.1725775
-0.1435245
0.0071315
-0.0819516
-0.1044947
-0.7950063
0.0823141
-0.5258648
-2.270494

109
15.02
0.0000
0.6910
0.6450
0.5958

0.258094
0.3724601
0.7362904
-0.1347089
1.032188
0.1794645
0.3207615
0.1966436
0.3521331
0.2052919
0.3909116
1.923201
2.613884
2.002111
0.2289561

Table A5.
Streamlined Model Regression Results
Source
Model
Residual
Total

87

ecstd
lnpopstd
grcapfstd
impctsstd
pprtsstd
milintstd
commom
civil
mixed
_cons

SS

df

71.5612217
36.4387783
108
Coef.
0.1026472
0.2260361
-0.3422143
0.8048927
0.2424697
0.2695244
1.106375
0.4531057
-0.7591129

Number of obs =
F (8,100) =
8 8.94515272 Prob > F =
100 0.364387783 R-Squared =
Adj R-squared =
108
1 Root MSE =
Std. Err.
0.728968
0.0748649
0.1450238
0.1548729
0.0834208
0.6492057
0.6159264
0.6156497
0.6084035

MS

t
1.41
3.02
-2.36
5.20
2.91
0.42
1.80
0.74
-1.25

P > |t|
0.162
0.003
0.20
0.000
0.005
0.679
0.075
0.463
0.215

[95% Conf. Int.]
-0.0419781
0.0775062
-0.6299373
0.4976292
0.0769651
-1.018481
-0.1156055
-0.7683259
-1.966168

109
24.55
0.0000
0.6626
0.6356
0.60365

0.2472724
0.374566
-0.0544912
1.112156
0.4079743
1.55753
2.328355
1.674537
0.4479423

Table A6.
Impartial Courts/Property Rights Interaction Model Regression Results
Source
Model
Residual
Total

88

ecstd
lnpopstd
grcapfstd
impctsstd
pprtsstd
pprtsimp~
milintstd
commom
civil
mixed
_cons

SS

df

75.4051485
32.5948516
108
Coef.
0.1214734
0.2257972
-0.6034834
0.3968601
0.6712787
0.2692262
0.1884447
1.017575
0.5198737
-0.7373469

Number of obs =
F (89,99) =
9 8.37834984 Prob > F =
99 0.329240925 R-Squared =
Adj R-squared =
108
1 Root MSE =
Std. Err.
0.0695108
0.0711629
0.1576389
0.1895584
0.1964591
0.0796814
0.6175586
0.5860454
0.5855321
0.5783531

MS

t
1.75
3.17
-3.83
2.09
3.42
3.38
0.31
1.74
0.89
-1.27

P > |t|
0.084
0.002
0.000
0.039
0.001
0.001
0.761
0.086
0.377
0.205

[95% Conf. Int.]
-0.0164511
0.0845946
-0.9162732
0.0207351
0.2814611
0.111121
-0.145266
-0.145266
-0.641949
-1.884925

109
25.45
0.0000
0.6982
0.6708
0.5738

0.259398
0.3669998
-0.2906935
0.7729851
1.061096
0.4273313
2.180417
2.180417
1.681696
0.410231

Table A7.
Entrepreneurial Effectiveness Proxy Model Regression Results
Source
Model
Residual
Total

89

ecstd
lnpopstd
grcapfstd
eestd
commom
civil
mixed
_cons

SS

df

71.7071875
36.2928126
108
Coef.
0.917455
0.1855764
0.7297926
0.0152452
1.002759
0.5222534
-0.7182993

Number of obs =
F (6,102) =
6 11.9511979 Prob > F =
102 0.355811888 R-Squared =
Adj R-squared =
108
1 Root MSE =
Std. Err.
0.0715906
0.0746641
0.0687915
0.6393999
0.6054626
0.6090248
0.6003699

MS

t
1.28
2.49
10.61
0.02
1.66
0.86
-1.20

P > |t|
0.203
0.015
0.000
0.981
0.101
0.393
0.234

[95% Conf. Int.]
-0.0502541
0.0374806
0.5933449
-1.253002
-0.1981729
-0.6857444
-1.90913

109
33.59
0.0000
0.6640
0.6442
0.5965

0.233745
0.3336722
0.8662402
1.283492
2.203692
1.730251
0.4725315
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